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For many legal futurists, attorneys’ work is a prime target for automation. 
They view the legal practice of most businesses as algorithmic: data (such as 
facts) are transformed into outputs (agreements or litigation stances) via 
application of set rules. These technophiles promote substituting computer 
code for contracts and descriptions of facts now written by humans. They 
point to early successes in legal automation as proof of concept. TurboTax 
has helped millions of Americans file taxes, and algorithms have taken over 
certain aspects of stock trading. Corporate efforts to “formalize legal code” 
may bring new efficiencies in areas of practice characterized by both legal 
and factual clarity.  
 
However, legal automation can also elide or exclude important human values, 
necessary improvisations, and irreducibly deliberative governance. Due 
process, appeals, and narratively intelligible explanation from persons, for 
persons, depend on forms of communication that are not reducible to 
software. Language is constitutive of these aspects of law. To preserve 
accountability and a humane legal order, these reasons must be expressed in 
language by a responsible person. This basic requirement for legitimacy 
limits legal automation in several contexts, including corporate compliance, 
property recordation, and contracting. A robust and ethical legal profession 
respects the flexibility and subtlety of legal language as a prerequisite for a 
just and accountable social order. It ensures a rule of persons, not machines. 
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Introduction 
 
Will law become a subdivision of computer science? The idea might 
seem far-fetched now, given attorneys’ distinctive professional role as 
crafters and maintainers of social order. However, the history of the 
professions is one of jurisdictional turf battles, as rival elites claim the right 
to solve certain problems, or fill certain social roles.1 More recently, the 
spread of automation to white-collar work has prompted futurists to predict 
that artificial intelligence will complete many tasks now performed by 
lawyers—or replace them entirely.2 
There are some realms of legal practice where algorithms—a building 
block of artificial intelligence—have already displaced legal workers. 
Automated document review is a staple of discovery now. A worker is far 
more likely to use TurboTax than to visit a lawyer or accountant to prepare 
annual returns for the Internal Revenue Service. Lawmakers could eventually 
draft tax statutes in the form of computer code, eliminating the interpretative 
step that TurboTax’s lawyers and engineers must take as they translate 
statutory requirements into their software.3 
However, both lawmakers and regulators should be cautious as they 
attempt to code legal obligations into software. While computer code and 
human language both enable forms of communication, the affordances 
offered by each are distinct and, in many respects, mutually exclusive. Code 
seeks to eliminate the forms of ambiguity and flexibility characteristic of 
much language, including legal language.4 Just as quests to replace all 
standards with rules have failed, so too will most efforts to rewrite legal rules 
as code. 
To be sure, technology is already assisting civil lawyers in their 
traditional roles as advocates and advisors, and will continue to do so in the 
                                                          
1 ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT 
LABOR (2014). 
2 Frank Pasquale and Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. DISC. 26, 28 (2015); Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the 
Jurisprudence of Behaviorism, U. TORONTO L. REV. (forthcoming, 2018). 
3 Sarah B. Lawsky, Formalizing the Code, 70 TAX L. REV. 377, 379 (2017). 
4 DAVID GOLUMBIA, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF COMPUTATION 78 (2009). 
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future.5 But can it replace them entirely? For many futurists, who project 
industrial trends onto the profession of law, the answer is a resounding yes.6 
Legal futurists predict that software will not only help lawyers find the cases 
relevant to their briefs, but write the briefs themselves.7 Some predict a “legal 
singularity,” which will “arrive when the accumulation of massively more 
data and dramatically improved methods of inference make legal uncertainty 
obsolete.”8 For many journalists, the arguments are compelling, and support 
a surfeit of stories on the “end of lawyers” and the “death of Big Law.”9 
Legal futurists build on the work of legal software vendors, who tend 
to dismiss ordinary practice as riddled with inefficiency (in order to market 
their wares as far better by comparison).10 Both groups prescribe the 
automation of legal services as a way to advance access to justice, reduce 
legal costs, and promote the rule of law.11 Legal futurists characterize these 
developments as a democratization of law and an empowerment of ordinary 
individuals.12  They tap into both conservative, pro-market rhetoric against 
the professions, and left-wing distrust of elites.13 Nor is legal futurism 
                                                          
5 This article focuses on the role of technology in civil legal practice, because calls for the 
technological displacement of legal work in the criminal context have been far more muted 
than they are in the civil space.  For critical perspectives on substitutive automation of 
criminal law enforcement personnel, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing Police Robots, 64 UCLA 
L. REV. DISC. 516 (2016); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable 
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 350 (2015). 
6 John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence 
Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3041, 3041–42 (2014).  
7 RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS 202 (2015) 
(describing computerized drafting of legal and other documents). 
8 Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 
443 (2016); Benjamin Alarie et al., Law in the Future, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 423 (2016).  
9 See, e.g., Tom Meltzer, Robot Doctors, Online Lawyers and Automated Architects: the 
Future of the Professions?, THE GUARDIAN (June 15, 2014).  
10 Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1169, 1170 (2012) (promoting disruption of so-called legacy providers of legal services by 
information-technology-intensive corporations).  
11 SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 7, at 66–67. 
12 Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 939–41 (2013). 
13 For conservative rhetoric, see, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Machines vs. Lawyers, CITY J., 
Spring, 2014, http://www.city-journal.org/2014/24_2_machines-vs-lawyers.html (claiming 
that the “innovators driving our computational revolution . . . [are] likely to shape a politics 
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presented as merely one more dictate of an increasingly competitive market. 
Rather, it is praised as normatively desirable, a “new form of law” that “will 
emerge to provide all of the benefits of both rules and standards without the 
costs of either.”14  
Legal futurists tend to present the reduction of legal obligations to 
computer code as a positive evolutionary step toward the realization of the 
rule of law.15  Human attorneys can err about facts or misrepresent past 
precedent; human judges may be influenced by extraneous factors or bias.16 
Thus automators of law tend to see their work as one more step toward 
elevating the legal system above the fallibility of any particular person within 
it.17 One literal way of achieving the oft-quoted ideal “a rule of law, not of 
men” is to dispense altogether with persons implementing or interpreting 
law.18 For example, an unappealable fine imposed by a red light camera, and 
automatically deducted from a motorist’s bank account, would amount to 
pure automation of law, unaffected by any particular policeman’s or judge’s 
bias.  
Of course, this approach merely shifts personal responsibility from 
attorneys, regulators, and judges, to those coding their would-be 
replacements. Until some “master algorithm” can code its own progeny, 
                                                          
more friendly to markets.”). For left-wing suspicion of professionals as elites, see MAGALI 
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977). 
14 Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, University of 
Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 738 (2015), at 1, 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693826.  
15 Anthony D'Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1300 
(1977) (presenting computerization as a path to a more “determinable legal system.”).  
16 See, e.g., Ozkan Eren & Naci Mocan, Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles (NBER 
Working Paper No. 22611, 2016) (finding that unexpected losses in football games “played 
by a prominent college team in the state . . . increase disposition (sentence) lengths assigned 
by judges during the week following the game”). I discuss how sophisticated legal systems 
should address these kinds of biases in Part III.B., infra. 
17 J.C. Smith, Machine Intelligence and Legal Reasoning - The Charles Green Lecture in 
Law and Technology, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 277 (1998) (“From the perspective of the 
lawyer, we have the concept of the rule of law, as contrasted with the rule of persons; thus, 
in some sense separating the legal conceptual process from the human.”).  
18 Margaret Jane Radin explains that “The ideal of ‘the rule of law, not of men’ calls upon us 
to strive to ensure that our law itself will rule (govern) us, not the wishes of powerful 
individuals.” Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 781 (1989).  
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human beings will always be responsible for legal determinations.19 In order 
for legal automation to truly respect rule of law principles, the adage “a rule 
of law, not of men” thus must be complemented by a new commitment—to 
a “rule of persons, not machines.”20 Without attributing algorithmic 
judgments and interpretations to particular persons, and holding them 
responsible for explaining those judgments, legal automation will deflect and 
defeat basic principles of accountability. 
This article describes how language is often constitutive of law and 
legal judgments—not merely one of many forms they can take, but the only 
form capable of realizing foundational rule of law principles. Recognition of 
this power of language should guide the future of legal automation. This 
recognition also balances the emerging discourse of legal futurists, by 
articulating what is lost when society cedes more aspects of the authoritative 
articulation of rights and duties to computational processes.  
Substitutive legal automation is designed to replace, rather than 
merely aid, attorneys.21 Part I explores three areas where substitutive legal 
automation has become widespread: software now prepares millions of 
Americans’ taxes, firms like LegalZoom draft wills and contracts based on 
computerized interactions with customers, and chatbots like DoNotPay guide 
users through challenges to parking tickets. Each of these legal technologies 
democratizes access to information. However, they can also mislead users 
about their rights and duties, while foreclosing opportunities for 
                                                          
19 The leading academic treatment of the possibility of such automation is found in PEDRO 
DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM 12–20 (2015) (discussing how integration of five 
schools of machine learning may lead to rapid advances in computing). 
20 My shift from “men” to “persons” here reflects Radin’s rationale for making a similar 
move in her classic article on the rule of law: “For obvious reasons, because I am considering 
the Rule of Law in today’s context, I shall rephrase the ideal as ‘the rule of law, not of 
individuals.’ Yet we must not forget that when the ideal developed, and during most of its 
long history, it was inconceivable that any individuals who were not ‘men’ could be a part 
of political life.” Radin, supra note 18, at 781 n.1.  
21 This is to be contrasted with complementary legal automation, like search engines or word 
processing software, which assists attorneys. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, 
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 120 (13th ed. 2015) (describing complements and 
substitutes as fundamental economic categories to indicate the effect of one good or service 
on the value of others). 
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compensation for this harm, via restrictive terms of service. The language of 
law is both richer and more treacherous than these simple programs present.  
Despite these and similar problems with current, modest efforts to 
substitute technology for attorneys, both computer scientists and legal 
scholars have promoted even more ambitious programs of substitutive 
automation. Part II describes three of these initiatives, and their 
shortcomings. In each case, legal problems that appear at first merely to 
require a simple translation of language into computer code, turn out to hinge 
on far more complex social and political relationships. The flexibility and 
openness of language enables the type of improvisation necessary to  
maintain those relationships. Nevertheless, many legal futurists still promote 
a vision of self-executing law, embedded in code, as the ultimate goal of legal 
technology. 
Part III proposes an alternate approach: technology as tool to 
complement attorneys’ skills, rather than substitute for them. Drawing on the 
distinction between artificial intelligence and intelligence augmentation 
common in research on human-computer interaction, it promotes principles 
for complementary (rather than substitutive) legal automation. A 
complementary approach not only promises to serve clients better, but also 
to more fully realize rule of law values.  
Law is a complex and variegated domain, including services ranging 
from the humblest administrative processes to the highest stakes of 
imprisonment and freedom. So it should come as no surprise that the use of 
software and robots to draft, interpret, and enforce laws has varying degrees 
of plausibility, depending on the context. Obtaining a fishing license with a 
chatbot makes sense—and we should see more and better examples of such 
“civic tech” in coming years.22 On the other hand, even the most enthusiastic 
boosters of legal automation do not want to see prison sentences handed down 
by robot judges or juries. More difficult questions arise between these two 
extremes, to which we shall now turn. 
                                                          
22 Civic tech can be defined as the use of technology by governments to promote positive 
interactions among citizens themselves, and between citizens and their state. Michael 
Halberstam, Beyond Transparency: Rethinking Election Reform from an Open Government 
Perspective, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (2015); MAYUR PATEL ET AL., THE 
EMERGENCE OF CIVIC TECH: INVESTMENTS IN A GROWING FIELD (2013). 
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I. CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF SUBSTITUTIVE LEGAL TECHNOLOGY 
 
 The most promising versions of legal automation are targeted at 
people who need and deserve—but cannot afford—an attorney. For example, 
in many low-income neighborhoods, thousands of children have juvenile 
records for crimes like selling marijuana or vandalism.23 States recognize that 
the resulting records should not hound persons after they become adults, and 
all have adopted some version of a process called expungement to seal such 
records.24 Attorneys can usually arrange for an expungement relatively 
quickly—but not everyone has access to a lawyer. Therefore, public interest 
attorneys and technologists have developed apps like Expunge|Maryland 
(designed for Maryland residents) to automate much of the process of seeking 
a simple expungement.25 
 These apps fill a gap in the legal services market.  In general, the 
worse a job is done presently, the better a robot looks in comparison. For the 
average American citizen, quotidian interactions with legal authorities can 
range from the annoying to the cringe-inducing. Car registration, income tax 
calculation, application for financial aid—each can easily descend into 
confusing labyrinths of texts, punctuated with unsatisfactory interactions 
with rude and overworked bureaucrats. Software and app makers are now 
trying to ease that burden with innovative approaches to serving customers. 
However, each of these interventions has unexpected consequences which 
mitigate their value. 
 
A. Automating Tax Preparation 
 
                                                          
23 Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 963, 968 (2013); Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons 
for Non-Violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155 (2010). 
24 Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 353 (2014) 
25 See Tyler Waldman, Why ExpungeMaryland.org is Helping People Erase Their Criminal 
Records, TECHNICAL.LY: BALTIMORE (July 25, 2014), http://technical.ly/baltimore/
2014/07/25/expungemaryland-expunge-erase-criminal-records-baltimore/. On its website, 
the service is currently billed as an “expungement paralegal,” not an expungement lawyer.  
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 At tax time, Americans have long used software programs to calculate 
their income tax liability. TurboTax was established in the 1980s, and has 
become ever more dominant in the past few decades.26 The U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code is over 72,000 words; the agency administering it (the IRS) 
can generate hundreds or thousands of words of instructions for filling out 
single lines of return forms.27 TurboTax translates the welter of tax law into 
a series of questions. For users with simple returns, the software is strikingly 
easy to use. For those with more complex ones, it can be more trying—but is 
almost certainly easier to use than trying to figure out one’s liability alone. 
 TurboTax has saved U.S. taxpayers countless hours in tax preparation 
time. For its customers, the days of filling out tax forms with paper and pencil 
are over.28 However, the company’s success is not an entirely positive story. 
And it provides some early warning signs as we see other forms of legal 
automation entering the limelight. 
 First, for most citizens, tax returns are simple. One of America’s 
leading tax experts, William Gale, has estimated that the government could 
easily calculate the tax due from “non-itemizers” (that is, people who take a 
standard deduction, rather than specifically claiming expenditures like a 
mortgage interest deduction or moving expenses).29 The IRS could base its 
                                                          
26 TurboTax became available in the mid-80s to businesses and individuals. See Richard P. 
Weber, TurboTax, J. AM. TAX ASS’N (Spring 1986) (reviewing the software).  
27 JEFFREY A. WINTERS, OLIGARCHY 223 (2011) (describing the complexity of the code as 
an outgrowth of interest group politics). 
28 Filing Season Statistics for Week Ending, IRS (Dec. 25, 2015) https://www.irs.gov/
uac/newsroom/filing-season-statistics-for-week-ending-december-25-2015 (IRS stats only 
show the breakdown for e-filed returns, which constitute 85.5% of returns. Of those, in 2015, 
39% were self-prepared, 61% prepared by tax professionals. Of the paper returns submitted, 
there is no information about how many of those were generated by software.). 
29 William G. Gale, Remove the Return, in TOWARD TAX REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE 41 (2009) (estimating that 60 million filers could use this 
method); Austan Goolsbee, The Simple Return: Reducing America’s Tax Burden Through 
Return-Free Filing, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION DISCUSSION PAPER (July 2006), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2006/07/useconomics-goolsbee; Liz Day, How 
the Maker of TurboTax Fought Simple Free Filing, PROPUBLICA (updated Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-maker-of-turbotax-fought-free-simple-tax-
filing (“Advocates say tens of millions of taxpayers could use such a system each year, saving 
them a collective $2 billion and 225 million hours in prep costs and time, according to one 
estimate.”).  
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annual bill on information already provided to it by employers—and give 
individuals the choice to either accept that tax, or try filing their own returns. 
Gale and other advocates pressed the IRS to offer this option to non-
itemizers.30 Sensing a threat to its business model, TurboTax fought back.31 
It spent millions of dollars to lobby against the proposal, even stirring up so-
called “grassroots” opposition via a public relations firm.32 The legal 
automators beat back the proposal, demonstrating that high technology firms 
can have a vested interest in keeping things complicated enough to assure 
steady demand for their services. 
 The mere availability of software like TurboTax may have other, 
troubling effects on legislators. According to Lawrence Zelenak, when tax 
returns were primarily done on paper, Congress “did not impose income tax 
provisions of great computational complexity on large numbers of taxpayers, 
in the belief that it was unreasonable to require average taxpayers (or their 
paid preparers) to struggle with” such details.33 Zelenak argues that tax return 
preparation software eliminated that “complexity constraint,” freeing 
legislators to impose ever more baroque provisions. Interacting provisions 
governing credits, deductions, exclusions, and the alternative minimum tax 
make the resulting income tax a “black box” for many of those using 
software—and nearly impossible to figure out for those who want to continue 
with manual preparation.34 That evolution might be a positive one if legal 
complexity clearly served positive social goals. But for Zelenak, the opposite 
                                                          
30 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, sec. 2004, 112 Stat. 685, 726 (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to “develop 
procedures for the implementation of a return-free tax system” by 2008); Gale, supra note 
29, at 43.  
31 Day, supra note 29.  
32 Liz Day, TurboTax Maker Linked to ‘Grassroots’ Campaign Against Simple, Free Tax 
Filing, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/turbotax-maker-
linked-to-grassroots-campaign-against-free-simple-tax-filing.  
33 Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 91, 
92 (2010). 
34 Id. at 93 (“As return preparation software gradually replaced the pencil in recent decades, 
the complexity constraint weakened and eventually disappeared. Congress has responded by 
imposing unprecedented computational complexity on large numbers of taxpayers.”).   
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is the case: he believes the computationally complex provisions of the tax 
code “generally constitute bad tax policy.”35 
 Both TurboTax’s lobbying, and the rise of computational complexity 
in the tax code, embody an enduring problem in automation. Technologists 
cannot assume that computational solutions to one problem will not affect the 
scope and nature of that problem. Instead, as technology enters fields, 
problems change, as various parties seek to either entrench or disrupt aspects 
of the present situation for their own advantage. In the two examples above, 
the legal automation firm (TurboTax) helped entrench unnecessary returns, 
while the government made already complex tax preparation even more 
difficult. While TurboTax portrays itself as the taxpayer’s inexpensive, 
efficient, robotic advocate, it is also serving those in government who wish 
to complicate the tax code.  
 
B. Providing Forms 
 
 Founded in 2001, LegalZoom leads the field in providing 
personalized legal forms.36 By 2011, LegalZoom claimed to have served over 
2 million individuals with downloadable forms and internet-mediated walk-
throughs of questionnaires and flow charts related to their legal problems.37 
LegalZoom does not claim to be offering a lawyer to its users; rather, it claims 
to be offering “legal information” as a sophisticated series of forms and 
queries.38 
                                                          
35 Id. at 93. 
36 LegalZoom.com, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-1) 1 (June 4, 
2012), at http://perma.cc/XAL5-WUVS. 
37 Lauren Moxley, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to Reforming 
the Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 553 
(2015); LegalZoom, http://perma.cc/FZJ7-DV53; see also Catherine J. Lanctot, Does 
Legalzoom Have First Amendment Rights: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Speech and 
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 257 (2011). 
38 See Moxley, supra note 37, at 554 (“LegalZoom is able to keep costs low by producing 
much of its work through automated generation and review by nonlawyers….[I]t 
characterizes its services as the dissemination of ‘legal information,’ which non-lawyers are 
permitted to do, as opposed to the dispensation of ‘legal advice,’ which would constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law (‘UPL’)”) (footnotes omitted). 
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 The firm has been popular, particularly for those looking to set up 
companies. The paperwork can be complex, and LegalZoom condenses what 
could be a lengthy series of meetings with attorneys into a three step process. 
First, the program asks users to answer a series of questions. Then, 
LegalZoom employees review answers for “consistency and completeness.”  
Once these workers have approved the answers given, the program prints the 
form and sends it to the user—along with instructions on how to execute the 
necessary formalities for the document to have legal effect.  
 Whatever the qualifications of these scriveners, the questionnaire 
process itself can be partial or problematic.39 As of 2015, one could go 
through the questionnaire process without any prompting about the special 
complexities raised by the savings vehicle where most middle class 
Americans’ non-home assets are—employer-sponsored retirement savings 
account.40 It turns out that, in many cases, a will does not control the 
distribution of those assets at their owner’s death; rather, that’s the job of a 
document memorializing the account owner’s designation of beneficiaries.  
This is not merely a speculative concern. As the Wall Street Journal has 
reported, some family members are surprised by the ultimate disposition of 
assets from 401(k) plans and individual retirement accounts (IRAs). “That’s 
where most of the wealth in America ends up,” said a certified public 
accountant, “but what most people don't realize is it's surrounded by this 
                                                          
39 There is also widespread concern that LegalZoom, a leading form provider, engages in the 
unauthorized practice of law. Wendy S. Goffe & Rochelle Heller, From Zoom to Doom? 
Risks of Do-it-yourself Estate Planning, ESTATE PLANNING, Aug. 2011, at 27; Pierce G. 
Hunter, Driving Legal Business Without a License, LegalZoom, Inc., and Campbell v. 
Asbury Automotive, Inc., 2011 Ark. 157, 381 S.W.3d 21, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
201 (2014); Assurance of Discontinuance, In re LegalZoom.com Inc., No. 10-2-02053-2 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2010) (mandating “assurance of discontinuance” of suspect 
activities); Janson v. LegalZoom 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1063 (W.D. Mo. 2011); 
LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2014 WL 1213242 (Super. Ct. 
Mar. 24, 2014); but see Medlock v. LegalZoom.Com, Inc., No. 2012-208067, 2013 S.C. 
LEXIS 362, *16 (S.C. Oct. 18, 2013). 
40 Screenshots on file with author. For documentation of prevalence of retirement accounts, 
see Carolyn T. Geer, Family Feuds: The Battles over Retirement Accounts, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 7, 2011) (“IRAs and 401(k)s now account for roughly 60% of the assets of U.S. 
households with at least $100,000 to invest.”). 
13 
 
complex labyrinth of rules.”41 Thus, “key questions are not asked, people 
make mistakes, and many times it involves their life savings.”42  
Presumably once this issue is brought to the attention of a bureaucrat 
at a high enough level within LegalZoom, the software will be amended to 
reflect the important role of beneficiary forms. The firm cultivates user 
forums in order to ventilate such concerns. The work of these forums is 
controversial. Internet boosters like Clay Shirky characterize them as a form 
of charity, or a new form of community building.43 Others call forum 
commenting a form of “shadow work” creeping in to the experience of those 
who answer questions, and a degradation of quality of service for those who, 
lacking real experience of a qualified accountant or tax lawyer, may have no 
sense of what they are missing.44  
Business experts offer plans on how to psychologically reward 
contributors (since investors are wary of any fixed labor costs).  
“Gamification” is one easy answer—offering answerers points and publicly 
posting their ranking relative to other would-be helpers.45 For Amazon’s top 
reviewers, the system has brought microcelebrity status.46 For others, the 
rewards are less clear. But what should be obvious is the shifting role of AI 
in these scenarios. TurboTax or LegalZoom forums are very often not 
answering tough legal questions. Rather, the key automation technology here 
is a form of management which uses marketing and other tactics to draw 
individuals to offer their “expertise” for free—and to encourage users to rely 
on such “expertise” with no assurance it is correct.  
 
C. Contesting Parking Tickets 
 
                                                          
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
43 CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS (2010). 
44 CRAIG LAMBERT, SHADOW WORK: THE UNPAID, UNSEEN JOBS THAT FILL YOUR DAY 
(2016). 
45 KEVIN WERBACH AND DAN HUNTER, FOR THE WIN HOW GAME THINKING CAN 
REVOLUTIONIZE YOUR BUSINESS 2 (2012).  
46 JOSEPH M. REAGLE, READING THE COMMENTS: LIKERS, HATERS, AND MANIPULATORS AT 
THE BOTTOM OF THE WEB 57 (2015) (describing “super-reviewer” Grady Harp).  
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Red light cameras are a widely implemented version of robotic law 
enforcement. All that is necessary for the robot to enforce traffic law is a 
simple set of rules declaring that any person who owns a car that passes under 
a light when it is red shall be fined a certain amount, and/or lose their license 
to operate the car.47 What if the owner wasn’t actually driving? Add in a facial 
recognition subroutine, and better resolution video cameras connected to the 
red light camera. Advocates of robotic law enforcement envision even finer 
grained systems of social control embedded, ambiently, into roads, 
sidewalks, and other features of daily life.48 
 Nevertheless, these steps toward the automation of traffic law merit 
some skepticism. Consider, for example, the verification of medical 
emergencies in the case of the parking ticket appeal app. If the city simply 
accepts any appeal, bad actors are certain to take advantage of the app 
eventually. Parking authorities can order audits. In some areas, like health 
care fraud, big data and predictive analytics has made it much easier to expose 
cheaters.49 But the auditing process seems to rely upon some form of human 
interaction and expertise. 
 For hard-core legal futurists, though, even audits could be automated. 
It is all a matter of piggybacking new technical systems on old patterns of 
monitoring and data exchange. Many states already require versions of 
computerized physician order entry (CPOE); digital health records have 
become widespread.50 Any given visit to a doctor may generate a unique visit 
                                                          
47 Andrea M. Franklin, Police Powers for Sale: Red-Light Enforcement Sold to the Foreign 
Bidder, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 125 (2012); William D. Mercer, At the Intersection of 
Sovereignty and Contract: Traffic Cameras and the Privatization of Law Enforcement 
Power, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 379 (2012); Jeffrey A. Parness, Beyond Red Light Enforcement 
Against the Guilty but Innocent: Local Regulations of Secondary Culprits, 47 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 259 (2011).  
48 Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL 
FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 187 (Roger Brownsword & 
Karen Yeung, eds., 2008) (describing pervasive monitoring and regulation via landscapes 
and buildings saturated with sensors, processors, and actuators). 
49 FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL 
MONEY AND INFORMATION 150–53 (2015); Frank Pasquale, Private Deputies and Certifiers 
in American Health Law, 92 N.C.L. REV. 1661, 1676 (2014). 
50 Frank Pasquale, Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health Care, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
1661, 1665 (2014) (mentioning big data methods at HHS). 
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identifier or time-stamped barcode that could, in turn, be deployed as 
verification in any number of scenarios: an excuse from work, or a parking 
emergency, or a claim for insurance. So the scope and intensity of automation 
crucially depends on coordination among healthcare providers, employers, 
insurers, and many other entities in developing machine readable, verifiable 
records of behavior that has some legal import. 
 Moreover, even a technical innovation as pedestrian as the red light 
camera has sparked both constitutional and legal challenges. For example, 
Joel Christensen has argued that the cameras violate fundamental 
constitutional principles of due process and the right of defendants to 
confront their accusers.51 These challenges have, so far, largely failed in 
courts that are eager to accelerate the resolution of what they perceive to be 
relatively minor disputes. Nevertheless, public outrage about red light 
cameras has reversed their advance; there are now less red light cameras in 
use today than there were in 2010.52  
 Is this outrage justifiable? For some civil rights advocates, the answer 
is a resounding no. Studies indicate that camera driven enforcement is less 
likely to be racially biased than traffic stops by police officers.53 But there is 
also ample evidence that algorithmic processes of sentencing and risk-
assessment can be racially biased.54 Automation like red light cameras has 
been characterized as a troubling form of state power—an unstoppable 
machine arrayed against ordinary citizens.55 However, for many believers in 
                                                          
51 Joel Christensen, Wrong on Red: The Constitutional Case Against Red-Light Cameras, 32 
J.L. & POL’Y 443 (2010). 
52 Charles Lane, Red Light Camera Use Declines After Public Outrage, ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (NPR, May 23, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/05/23/479207945/red-light-
camera-use-declines-after-public-outrage. 
53 Robert J. Eger et al., The Policy of Enforcement: Red Light Cameras and Racial Profiling, 
18 POLICE Q. 397 (2015); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023 
(2017).  
54 Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (work on risk assessment algorithm). 
55 See Jathan Sadowski & Frank Pasquale, The Spectrum of Control: A Social Theory of the 
Smart City, 20 FIRST MONDAY 5 (July 6, 2015); Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Privacy in an 
Era of Asymmetrical Social Control, in BIG DATA, CRIME, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (Aleš 
Završnik, ed., 2018).  
16 
 
the power of technology, the answer to problems caused by technology is 
simple: more technology. If the city automates traffic enforcement, then give 
citizens an application (“app”) for their smartphones to empower a quick and 
effective challenge when they have been unfairly fined. 
A chatbot developer claims that his technology has successfully 
appealed 160,000 parking tickets (out of about 225,000 cases where the app 
was used).56 The DoNotPay app guides individuals through potential appeals 
of parking tickets.57 For drivers in New York, the app suggests that a medical 
emergency can exempt a car owner from a parking ticket. If a similar 
exemption governs red lights, when there are no other automobiles in sight, 
we can envision not merely the robotization of aspects of traffic and parking 
law, but also the complementary automation of appeals against them. 
 The automation of such appeals is in its early stages. It could lead to 
the same dynamics now afflicting tax: a technology-enabled turn toward 
complexity and micro-enforcement. The more widely known apps like 
DoNotPay become, the more likely bad actors are to deploy it to lie about the 
actual circumstances of their ticketing. That will, in turn, motivate even more 
pervasive surveillance of city streets to monitor the exact situation ticketed in 
any given case. Municipalities are already automating many services; they 
may replace so-called “meter maids” with robotics and internet of things 
(IOT) sensors that tend toward perfect enforcement of the law.58  
 Citizens may be lulled into accepting such a state of affairs by 
assuming that the same technological advances that aid law enforcement, will 
also help them combat unfair or unwise applications of laws. Many 
                                                          
56 Samuel Gibbs, Chatbot Lawyer Overturns 160,000 Parking Tickets in London and New 
York, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2016); see also Kelly Phillips Erb, Are We Ready for Robot 
Lawyers? PA. LAW., May/June 2016, at 54. Note that citizens who meticulously filled out 
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57 Tim Cushing, Chatbot Helps Drivers Appeal over $4 Million in Bogus Parking Tickets, 
TECHDIRT (July 1, 2016); Danielle Furfaro, “Robot” Ticket Nixer, N.Y. POST (June 29, 
2016). 
58 For approaches to improving law enforcement via new technologies of monitoring, see 
STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFORD, THE RESPONSIVE CITY: ENGAGING 
COMMUNITIES THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE (2014); BETH SIMONE NOVECK, 
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technologists are now beginning to claim that there is no difference between 
their software and personal legal expertise. Journalists push the DoNotPay 
app as a “robot lawyer.”59 and the DoNotPay first page states “DoNotPay has 
launched the UK's first robot lawyer as an experiment. It can talk to you, 
generate documents and answer questions. It is just like a real lawyer, but is 
completely free and doesn't charge any commission.”60 But attorney-client 
interactions are not experiments. A lawyer is obliged to offer the best advice 
she can, and to take responsibility for falling below a certain standard of 
care.61 Just as a physician has a fiduciary duty do conscientiously divide 
treatment between clinical care and medical experimentation (with a very 
different set of rules and obligations governing each), a lawyer cannot abide 
by rules of professional ethics if she (or software she has written) is A/B 
testing various legal strategies on clients without letting them know the nature 
of the experimentation.62  App-driven legal tech like DoNotPay is not a 
lawyer, robot or otherwise, no matter how much hype it attracts. 
One also wonders exactly how much DoNotPay adds to existing 
efforts to expand access to law by firms like Nolo, which have provided forms 
for years.63 Browder’s chatbot provides forms. It does not fill them out. It 
relies on users to apply rules to the facts.  Moreover, unlike an ethically 
                                                          
59 Tim Eigo, Robots and the Lawyers Who Love Them, ARIZ. ATT’Y, (July/August 2016) 
60 See DoNotPay Website, http://www.donotpay.co.uk/.  
61 The American Bar Association’s Rules of Professional Conduct provide that lawyers 
cannot prospectively limit their liability with clients in fear of a malpractice action. In order 
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James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users, 13 COLO. 
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Affects the Agency Relationship in Medical and Legal Practice, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, 
L. & ETHICS 296 (2014). 
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practicing attorney, it shifts the risk of error to its ostensible client.64 Indeed, 
Browder’s app goes further; its users “agree to indemnify, defend and hold 
harmless [DoNotPay and Browder], our directors, officers, employees and 
licensors from and against any claim, liability, cost, damage or loss we may 
incur (including reasonable legal fees) as a result of any material that you 
post, transmit and download on our site or via any other communications 
systems.”65 The magnanimity of DoNotPay’s public relations campaign ends 
here. A human professional accepts consequences when things go badly 
wrong. This “robot lawyer,” by contrast, does not merely refuse to take 
responsibility, but holds the “client” responsible when its proprietor is 
harmed by their interaction.  
 
II. PLANS FOR FUTURE SUBSTITUTIVE LEGAL AUTOMATION 
 
 The most widespread examples of substitutive legal automation exist 
in the consumer sphere, in fields like tax, will preparation, and traffic 
disputes. Even in these relatively sedate areas of practice, they have raised 
serious ethical concerns about unintended consequences and consumer 
protection. But on balance, substitutive legal automation in these fields is a 
laudable phenomenon when the stakes of a matter are low. Numerous studies 
document unmet legal needs among those of low-to-middle socioeconomic 
status in the United States.66 Software may be the only form of advice 
available to many citizens, and even many small businesses. 
                                                          
64 See DoNotPay Terms of Service, http://www.donotpay.co.uk/terms.php (“You 
acknowledge and agree that you bear full responsibility for your own DoNotPay.co.uk 
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 Early successes in consumer services have inspired a new generation 
of legal automators to push for businesses and governments to standardize 
and computerize work once done by attorneys (or other personnel who 
interpreted and applied law). The promise here is less “access to justice” than 
“reducing legal spending.” Cost savings are a powerful argument in an era of 
increasing global competition and declining state revenues. But in many 
cases, the automation of legal services hides the externalization of cost and 
risk to customers, citizens, and business rivals. The immediate savings in 
personnel costs are obvious; the long-term costs are highlighted below. 
Already documented in extant legal automation projects, these costs are also 
foreseeable in idealistic proposals to accelerate the robotization of law. 
 
A. Requirements Extraction as Privacy Compliance 
 
For legal futurists, legal processes are essentially algorithmic in 
nature: data (the facts) are transformed into outputs (a judgment or result) via 
application of set rules.67 This model is easiest to imagine in the realm of 
financial contracts: for example, a contract may require someone to buy 100 
shares of stock at $10 a share from a counterparty if the price of gold falls 
below $800 an ounce. If both parties can agree to an authoritative source of 
data on the price of gold, a way to escrow the shares and the money needed 
to buy them, and an automated way of enabling the transfer of ownership of 
the shares once the gold price condition is triggered, the contract is effectively 
automated. 
 Dividing transactions into dozens or hundreds of component parts like 
this may seem like a tempting target for efficiency mavens. However, the 
legal world can become intractable for programs once a bit more complexity 
(such as jurisdictional or constitutional concerns, preemption doctrines, or 
                                                          
and (iv) state courts were experiencing large increases in the number of unrepresented 
litigants unable to afford a lawyer.) (quoting Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice 
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67 DAVID HOWARTH, LAW AS ENGINEERING (2014); see also David Howarth, Is Law a 
Humanity?, 3 ARTS & HUMANITIES IN HIGH. EDUC. 9, 11–12 (2004). 
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statutory carve-outs in a largely common law topic) enters the picture. That 
is one reason why so much energy is now directed toward legal technology 
for business-to-business transactions.  
 For example, teams of programmers and attorneys led by Travis 
Breaux at the computer science department of Carnegie Mellon University 
have modeled the problem of compliance with privacy law as one of inputs 
(data) and outputs (certain restrictions on the scope and extent of data sharing 
permissible). Under federal health privacy law, a large hospital may enter into 
over 500 business associate agreements with firms ranging from credit card 
companies to cloud vendors.68 These contracts are designed to specify 
restrictions on the extent to which personal health information may be 
transferred from the hospital, as a covered entity, to other entities.69  
 Breaux and his co-authors have analyzed regulations and policies, 
breaking them into constituent semantics (the meaning of particular terms) 
and syntax (the legally prescribed relations among terms). They program 
computers to generate compliance outputs for particular scenarios.70 For 
example, a patient’s health record at their primary care physician’s office may 
indicate that the patient has diabetes. Once that data about diabetes is in the 
relevant database, certain restrictions may be superimposed on it. The data 
may always be accessible to the patient herself, or to other physicians seeking 
to treat the patient.71 It may only be used for marketing purposes if a specific 
consent has been signed.72  
                                                          
68 Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data 
Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 618 (2014).  
69 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (“Protected health information means individually identifiable 
health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is: (i) 
transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or 
maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information excludes 
individually identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records described 
at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its 
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70 Travis Breaux & Calvin Powers, Early Studies in Acquiring Evidentiary, Reusable 
Business Process Models for Legal Compliance, 6TH INT’L CONF. ON INFO. TECH.: 5–6 
(2009).  
71 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2014); 45 C.F.R. §164.506 (2013).  
72 45 C.F.R. § 164.501, 164.508(a)(3). 
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To convert contracts and statutes into computer code, Breaux and 
affiliated researchers have deployed semantic parameterization, “in which 
rights and obligations from regulation texts are restated into restricted natural 
language statements, to describe discrete activities.”73 For example, a 
regulatory provision requiring that a health care provider must “post the 
notice for an individual to read” is divided into the subject of the requirement 
(the health care provider), the action (post), the object (a notice specifying 
data policies), and a purpose (getting an individual to read the notice).74 That 
purpose has a new set of atomic building blocks: the subject (an individual 
patient), an action (read), and an object (the notice).75  
Such decomposition of legal requirements into their component parts, 
coupled with rigorous definitions of the parts, is a valuable pedagogical and 
research tool. It promotes a careful parsing of legal terms and raises 
interesting questions about the meaning of terms like “read” and “notice” in 
a wide variety of settings. It is a helpful way of structuring questions about 
what a regulation or statute states propositionally. However, even a regulation 
as simple as this posting requirement raises further ambiguities about the 
meaning of the terms involved. What exactly must be in the notice? When 
the law specifies that the notice is “for an individual to read,” does that create 
any obligation on the provider to ensure reading actually occurs? How would 
that be validated?  
To be sure, questions like this do not paralyze the average compliance 
staff at a hospital or ambulatory surgical center. Notices are drafted, patients 
sign to indicate that they have read them, and medical care is delivered. But 
these notices are also tailored to settings. A notice in a setting with many 
English-as-a-second-language speakers may only ideally reflect that 
community’s concerns if it is designed and presented in a way distinct from 
                                                          
73 Travis D. Breaux et al., Towards Regulatory Compliance: Extracting Rights and 
Obligations to Align Requirements with Regulations, IEEE 14TH INT’L REQUIREMENTS 
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that dispensed in, say, a place without those demographic characteristics.76 A 
patient may refuse to sign—what then? May the notice requirement be met 
by an email sent before the patient’s visit—or after? A computational 
response to each of these eventualities is imaginable, and could be 
programmed into a robotic registration kiosk.77 However, there is also a fair 
chance that a person who, say, resists signing, will simply stand before an 
automated registration kiosk, helpless, before a person at the health care 
provider assists them. 
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is 
complicated enough to computerize.78 Health sector businesses now aspire to 
a multi-jurisdictional analysis of legal requirements to ensure business 
compliance for privacy generally. That would require incorporating, at a 
minimum, the privacy restrictions of American states, the federal 
government, and those of other governments where a firm may wish to 
transfer data.79 A CMU-based team has also addressed datasets including “the 
100 most frequently occurring semi-structured goals mined from over 100 
privacy policies.”80 The research trajectory is ambitious: Breaux and another 
co-author “plan to further validate this methodology, heuristics and patterns 
within the context of financial regulations and aviation standards to determine 
                                                          
76 Ari E. Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design 3 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_comments/2016/07/00005-128570.pdf (discussing the 
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77 Bill Hartlove, Patient Check-in Kiosk Goes Live at the Johns Hopkins Medical Laboratory 
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79 Travis Breaux & David Gordon, Reconciling Multi-Jurisdictional Legal Requirements: A 
Case Study in Requirements Water Marking, IEEE INT’L REQUIREMENTS ENG’G CONF. 
(2012). 
80 Breaux et al., supra note 73, at 3; see also Jaspreet Bhatia et al., Mining Privacy Goals 
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its applicability beyond healthcare.”81  Privacy and cybersecurity 
requirements are a key target for such automation.82 
 But before cost-containing general counsel become too excited about 
the automation of compliance, they should recognize the limits of this 
research. Breaux et al. concede that “[w]ithout further validation, it is 
premature to automate that which is currently performed manually.”83 Even 
more troublingly, they concede that “the role of constraints in identifying 
conflicts between rights and obligations must still be considered. Herein, we 
only identify trivial conflicts by observing negation and type-similar values 
in semantic models.”84 Such conflicts are common in information law: for 
example, the same firm may be under duties of non-spoliation and 
preservation (which require data to be maintained), and duties of data-
minimization (which may include the need to respect customers’ or business 
partners’ demands to delete data).85 Careful management of such conflicts is 
bread-and-butter work for attorneys, and requires human judgment about the 
balance of risks involved in any data retention strategy.86 
 
                                                          
81 Breaux et al., supra note 73, at 9. 
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B. Smart Contracts as Linguistic Robots 
 
A DVD may only be licensed for play in the US and Europe, and then 
be “coded” so it can only play in those regions and not others.87 Were a person 
playing the DVD for the user, he might demand a copy of the DVD’s terms 
of use and receipt, to see if it was authorized for playing in a given area.  
Computers need such a term translated into a language they can 
“understand;” or, in another characterization, the legal terms embedded in the 
DVD (and the environment of the program that runs it) must lead to 
predictable reactions from the hardware that encounters them.88 
These programs are still in their infancy, leading to predictable 
frustrations for users. Reactions to digital rights management software range 
from annoyance to outrage; online forums are full of advice on how to defeat 
the DVD zoning software. But to the extent laws articulate simple binaries of 
easily programmable desiderata, this automation may still have a bright 
future. For example, if the copryright law of a given country suddenly forbids 
the playing of certain media in computers, a Legal Requirements 
Specification Language (LRSL) may be hard coded into devices, enabling a 
centralized authority to simply flip a switch to automate compliance.89  Such 
                                                          
87 Peter Yu, Region Codes and the Territorial Mess, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 187, 191 
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evolving coding of legal requirements, to ensure that, if given regulation changes, products 
are accordingly updated to maintain legal compliance. 
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tools can also reformulate certain laws and present them as compliance 
requirements to a layperson.90  
Parties may also be more willing to enter into contracts if they can be 
assured of some degree of “automatic,” code-based enforcement.91 When it 
comes to simple supply chain management, there is some real promise for 
computable contracts. Imagine, for instance, a ship coming into port with 50 
tons of sugar in containers. Assuming sensors that are capable of identifying 
sugar, and assaying its weight and quality, and automated exchange could be 
devised. In some sense, virtually anyone who shops on Amazon experiences 
a similarly automatic exchange after a “one-click” transaction. As a former 
commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission recently 
observed, “Where a smart contract’s conditions depend upon real-world data 
(e.g., the price of a commodity future at a given time), agreed-upon outside 
systems, called oracles, can be developed to monitor and verify prices, 
performance, or other real-world events.”92 
                                                          
90 A 2007 study provided information on their Cerno tool, which similarly relied on phrase 
heuristics for analyzing policy and regulations to generate legal compliance outputs. Travis 
Breaux, et. al., Extracting Rights and Obligations from Regulations: Toward a Tool-
Supported Process, IEEE/ACM 22nd International Conference Automated Software 
Engineering (Nov. 2007), at https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~breaux/publications/nkiyavitskaya-
ase07.pdf. Another study discusses using the Frame-based Requirements Analysis Method 
for analyzing federal regulations to ensure software legal compliance, and evidence due 
diligence and good faith to comply. Travis Breaux, Exercising Due Diligence in Legal 
Requirements Acquisition: A Tool-supported, Frame-based Approach, 17th IEEE 
International Requirements Engineering Conference (2009), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/
~breaux/publications/tdbreaux-re09.pdf. 
91 Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 38–39 (2014) (“Smart contracts--automated programs that transfer 
digital assets within the block-chain upon certain triggering conditions--represent a new and 
interesting form of organizing contractual activity.”). The concept of a “smart contract” is 
widely believe to have originated in the work of Nick Szabo. Szabo, Formalizing and 
Security Relationships on Public Networks, 2 FIRST MONDAY no. 9 (1997). 
92 Nicolette De Sevres, Bart Chilton & Bradley Cohen, The Blockchain Revolution, Smart 
Contracts and Financial Transactions, 21 NO. 5 CYBERSPACE LAWYER 3, 3 (June 2016). A 
smart contract is created by encoding the terms of a traditional contract and uploading the 
smart contract to the blockchain. “Contractual clauses are automatically executed when pre-
programmed conditions are satisfied,” and because the transactions are monitored, validated, 
and enforced by the blockchain, there is no need for a trusted third party, such as an escrow 
agent. Id. 
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When it comes to more complex products, automation of elements of 
exchange can run into difficulties. Chickens, for example, might be a more 
difficult product to assess, or even weigh, then a standardized commodity like 
sugar. In a classic court case, Frigaliment v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 
the litigants disagreed vehemently on what the meaning of the word chicken 
was in a contract.93 Robotic assessments of physical reality are still delayed 
and corroded by a lack of data, or the messy complexity of discordant human 
meanings.94  
Therefore, legal automators have focused most of their energy on 
contracts related to online activity. For example, Oliver Goodenough of 
Vermont Law School and Mark Flood of the Office of Financial Research 
have developed the idea of smart contracts as “automatons” for executing 
deals once financial agreements have been represented computationally. 
Goodenough and Flood argue that “the fundamental legal structure of a well-
written financial contract follows a state-transition logic that can be 
formalized mathematically as a finite-state machine (also known as a finite-
state automaton),” where the “automaton defines the states that a financial 
relationship can be in, such as ‘default,’ ‘delinquency,’ ‘performing,” etc., 
and it defines an “alphabet” of events that can trigger state transitions, such 
as “payment arrives,” “due date passes,” and many more.95  
For Goodenough and Flood, a sufficiently automated system could 
increase both trust and efficiency among contracting parties. For example, an 
airline may promise an insurer that it will pay $10,000 on the first day of each 
month in order to purchase an insurance policy, which pays out $100,000 
                                                          
93 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see Aaron D. Goldstein, The Public Meaning Rule: 
Reconciling Meaning, Intent, and Contract Interpretation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73 
(2013).  
94 See concessions made in ADVANCES IN KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION, LOGIC 
PROGRAMMING, AND ABSTRACT ARGUMENTATION (Thomas Eiter, Hannes Strass, Mirosław 
Truszczyński, & Stefan Woltran eds., 2015); SILVIA MIKSCH, DAVID RIAÑO, & ANNETTE TEN 
TEIJE, KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION FOR HEALTH CARE (2014). See also Karen Levy, Book 
Smart, Not Street Smart: Blockchain Based Smart Contracts and the Social Workings of Law, 
3 ENGAGING SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY 1 (2017). 
95 Mark D. Flood & Oliver R. Goodenough, Contract as Automation: The Computational 
Representation of Financial Agreements (Office of Fin. Res. Working Paper No. 15-04, Mar. 
26, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2648460.  
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each month the average price of oil is above $90 a barrel. A contract like this, 
often called a “derivative,” helps airlines hedge against rises in fuel prices.  
Goodenough and Flood believe that an automaton could effectively robotize 
the relationship between the parties. The insurer could agree to an automatic 
transfer of $100,000 once another computer program indicated that it had 
calculated the average price of oil that month, and it was below $90 a barrel. 
The airline could enable automatic debiting of its bank account when that 
event occurs. Programmers could also decide what to do if, for some reason, 
the $10,000 did not come in by midnight of the first day of the month. 
The question of consequences for failure to meet the terms of the 
contract is a difficult one, which has major implications for the future of 
automation in many legal fields. There are always potential excuses--for 
example, the bank may have failed to transmit the funds, a new employee 
may have changed the accounts, or the insurer may have altered its own 
accounts in a way that made it difficult to pay. We all have some intuitive 
sense of what we would decide to be a fair resolution of any of these 
situations—or, more to the point, where a contract or statute might refer the 
dispute.96 But it is a far more formidable task to program that type of 
insight—let alone the ability to verify the factual predicates of each 
situation—into a single computer, or even into a network system capable of 
surveillance of all the parties involved. 
That is one reason why a wise programmer may decide simply to kick 
the dispute over to a panel of human mediators, who could be charged with 
quickly deciding whether the airline’s excuse for the delayed payment was 
sufficient to permit it to continue the contract, or enabled the insurer to 
terminate it. In other words, humans complementing the automated legal 
system would likely be the optimal result for all parties involved. We see this 
pattern repeatedly in the history of automation. For example, a computer first 
beat a chess grandmaster in the 1990s; by the mid-2000s, no grandmaster 
could defeat the best programs. However, a combination of human and 
                                                          
96 Arthur D. Hellman, Deciding Who Decides: Understanding the Realities of Judicial 
Reform, 15 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 343 (1990).  
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machine can defeat the best chess playing machines to this day.97 Similar 
cooperative modes are likely to prove optimal in legal contexts, particularly 
when the stakes of a dispute are high.98 
Nevertheless, regulators have urged (and in some cases required) 
financial institutions to express their contractual arrangements as code. CFTC 
and SEC staff concluded in a report “that current technology is capable of 
representing derivatives using a common set of computer- readable 
descriptions[, which] are precise enough to use both for the calculation of net 
exposures and to serve as part or all of a binding legal contract.”99 That 
optimism was also reflected in the agencies’ treatment of other securities. For 
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission “Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) recently finalized a rule requiring providers of some 
asset-backed securities (ABS’s) to file “downloadable source code in 
Python” to reflect the contractual arrangements embedded in the securities.100  
Despite that regulatory advance, requiring “filing of a waterfall 
computer program of the contractual cash flow provisions of the securities” 
remains an outstanding proposal for the SEC.101 On first glance, this 
forbearance is puzzling—uncertainties about cash flows in ABS’s helped 
spark the financial crisis of 2008, which was one of the main motivations 
                                                          
97 DIEGO RASSKIN-GUTMAN, CHESS METAPHORS: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE 
HUMAN MIND (2009). 
98 Anthony Sills, ROSS and Watson tackle the law, IBM (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2016/01/ross-and-watson-tackle-the-law/; Karen 
Turner, Meet ‘Ross,’ the newly hired legal robot, WASH. POST (May 16, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-
hired-legal-robot/?utm_term=.5620a08ad892. 
99 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) AND THE U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMMISSION (CFTC), JOINT STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF MANDATING 
ALGORITHMIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR DERIVATIVES (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/2011 /719b -study.pdf. Unfortunately, after considering the vagaries of 
accounting, securitization, and credit rating described above, it is diffi cult to credit the SEC’s 
optimism  here. Just as the FDIC’s hypothetical resolution of Lehman “amused many by its 
naiveté,” the staff appears to be promoting an aspiration as a likely achievement. Stephen J. 
Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 485, 486 
(2012).  
100 Asset-Backed Securities (proposed Apr. 7, 2010) https://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/2010/33-9117.pdf. This rule was finalized June 22, 2016. Asset-Backed Securities 
Disclosure and Registration, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229-230; 239; 249 (2016).  
101 Id. at 249. 
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behind the Dodd-Frank Act (which had required the SEC to better monitor 
the ABS market).102 However, the agency’s reticence reflected valid concerns 
among commenters representing financial institutions. For example, 
JPMorgan complained that “each ABS transaction has its own distinct 
characteristics,” and it would be expensive and of questionable utility to 
reduce each new one to Python code.103 AmeriCredit bluntly stated that it 
“should not be forced to predict and therefore program every possible slight 
iteration of all waterfall payments” because its firm “runs a business that 
purchases and services automobile loans, not a software development 
business.”104 UBMatrix expressed the view that programming obligations 
was not superior, in either accuracy or transparency, to simply writing them 
in text.105 
 A common theme animated comments on the proposal for the 
computerization of cash-flows in asset-backed securities. The SEC was 
promoting a one-size-fits-all requirement of translating legal agreements into 
software, while market realities precluded such standardization—or made it 
too expensive to be practicable.106 The ensuing barriers to computerization 
here should be a cautionary tale for advocates of legal process automation 
                                                          
102 See 15 U.S.C. §78o-7; 17 C.F.R. §§ 229-230; 239; 249 (2016). 
103 Letter from JP Morgan Chase & Co. on Proposed Rules for Asset-Backed Securities, 
Release Nos. 33-9117; 34-61858; File No. S7-08-10 to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Oct. 4, 2011) (on file with the SEC).  
104 Letter from AmerCredit Corp. on Proposed Rules for Asset-Backed Securities, Release 
Nos. 33-9117; 34-61858; File No. S7-08-10 to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the SEC).  
105 Letter from UBmatrix, Inc. on Proposed Rules for Asset-Backed Securities, Release Nos. 
33-9117; 34-61858; File No. S7-08-10 to the Securities and Exchange Commission (July 31, 
2010) (on file with the SEC) (“[R]eading a prospectus in text is easier and more efficient 
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106 Letter from Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar 
Association's Section of Business Law on Proposed Rules for Asset-Backed Securities, 
Release Nos. 33-9117; 34-61858; File No. S7-08-10 to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Aug. 17, 2010) (on file with the SEC). (“because ABS transactions frequently 
are structured during the marketing process to respond to feedback from investors as to their 
specific needs for a security with a particular feature, each new issuance is likely to have 
unique considerations that will require additional design, programming and maintenance 
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who berate the legal profession for providing “bespoke” services when, they 
say, mass production would do.107  
The “bespoke” metaphor does a great deal of rhetorical work which 
is rarely unpacked by those touting it. A bespoke suit is a luxury, unneeded 
by most.  The very wealthy may get their clothing personally tailored, but the 
rest of society makes do with ready-to-wear outfits. The simile between 
clothing manufacture and legal services breaks down in any moderately 
complex dispute. Anyone can look in the mirror and figure out whether his 
clothing fits or not. Legal advice is a credence service – it is very hard for the 
average person to know if he has been well advised.108 Thus we should be 
cautious when the startup Deftr rolls out its services with the motto, “law is 
not a Rolex,” and implies that democratized law should be as accessible as 
personalized time is now—from “a glance at my phone.”109 The statements 
are more reflective of business aspirations and anti-worker ideology than a 
solid read of the legal market. 
                                                          
107 See, e.g., Richard Susskind, From Bespoke to Commodity, 1 LEGAL TECH. J. 4 (2006) 
(criticizing “bespoke” legal services).  
108 Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV 105, 154–55 n.263 (2010) 
(“Both search for and carriage of information tend to be “credence goods,” whose value a 
consumer will have difficulty evaluating even after consuming it.”); See George A. Akerlof, 
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 
488 (1970) (discussing economic models involving “trust” and uncertain quality); Kenneth 
J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 
947, 965–66 (1963) (discussing behaviors influenced by information inequality in a medical 
context); Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of 
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68–72 (1973) (exploring credence goods where quality cannot 
be evaluated through normal use but only at additional cost).   
109 The Deftr mission statement reads, in part:  
The law is not a Rolex. . . . Some Rolexes are meticulously crafted over a 
period of a year or more. The complexity of mechanism, design and 
material make up their extraordinary expense, an expense that is well 
beyond the means of most. . . . Today this precision and accuracy is 
available in any boilerplate ten-buck wristwatch or from a glance at my 
phone. . . .We believe that understanding legal rules, properly drafted and 
interpreted, will not require the approach of a craftsman. We believe 
technology will drive that change. 
Deftr Mission Statement, http://thedeftr.com/blog/2016/07/07/what-we-believe/ (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2016). 
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In both the 1930s and the 1960s, leading economic commentators in 
the United States predicted permanent, mass unemployment thanks to the rise 
of machine substitutes for workers—exactly the type of commoditization 
Deftr both predicts and celebrates for attorneys.110 Like popular and trade 
press articles on “the end of lawyers,” their narrative is a simple one: a) 
software programs are getting better at recognizing patterns and even 
meaning in texts, b) most of legal practice is primarily about applying rules 
to factual situations, or predicting how the relevant authorities would apply 
the rules to a situation, c) computer programmers also apply rules to facts, 
and as the profession of coding advances, it will take over more and more 
rule-application scenarios. But even simple scenarios may disclose layers of 
complexity and uncertainty impossible to be properly coded into software or 
forms. 111 
 Consider, first, the question of meaning. Legal processes are 
concerned with explanation and judgment—a very different set of concerns 
than the predictive modeling and pattern recognition common in most legal 
automation.112 A legal decisionmaker is not simply trying to ensure that some 
result (liable or not liable, guilty or innocent) matches the results generated 
by the case documents including patterns of words most similar to the 
                                                          
110 DAVID F. NOBLE, FORCES OF PRODUCTION (1984); AMY SUE BIX, INVENTING OURSELVES 
OUT OF JOBS? (2000). These concerns focused on manufacturing, and some simple service 
sector jobs. By the 1980s, advances in artificial intelligence at the time led to a flurry of 
concern within the legal profession about the substitutability of machine for human 
judgment. These concerns subsided for about two decades, but are now expressed almost 
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111 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (Powell, concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (“Even the briefest reflection the tasks for which lawyers are trained and the variation 
among the services they perform should causation against facile assumptions that legal 
services can be classified in to the routine and the unique. In most situations it is impossible 
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scope of problems that may be encountered even when handling a matter that at the outset 
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112 Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of 
Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (2017) (distinguishing between intuitively 
plausible chains of causation and big data pattern recognition, in the Fourth Amendment 
context). 
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patterns of words in the case documents before the decisionmaker.113 Rather, 
the decisionmaker is assessing the meaning of the facts and the meaning of 
the law in the situation. Legal functions that seem routine to a non-lawyer 
may create scenarios that require policy judgment, wisdom, and a 
responsibility akin to legislation or governance.114 
 Consider, for instance, a very common problem in the United States 
chronicled in David Dayen’s book, Chain of Title.115 After the financial crisis 
of 2008, banks were foreclosing on millions of homeowners. Many 
homeowners tried to negotiate for restructuring of their debt, but debt 
servicers turned them away. Some homeowners noticed that the entities on 
the paperwork filed for the foreclosure did not seem to match the paperwork 
they were sent when their mortgage was sold to a trust in order to complete a 
mortgage-backed security.116 As Dayen chronicles, many of the banks and 
the trusts holding mortgage-backed securities did not in fact fill out the 
correct paperwork in order to verify their claim to ownership of the property 
they were suing for. 
 This was a genuinely new situation in property law. Lawyers had to 
rapidly analyze the relevant law and make a novel case for their clients. 
Moreover, in many states, this was not a situation where homeowners could 
                                                          
113 Frank Pasquale and Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of 
Behaviorism, 68 U. TOR. L.J. 63, 79 (there are “potential flaws in many ML [machine 
learning]-driven research programs using NLP [natural language processing] to predict 
outcomes in legal systems. When such research programs ignore meaning – the foundation 
of legal reasoning – their utility and social value is greatly diminished. We also believe that 
such predictive tools are, at present, largely irrelevant to debates in jurisprudence. If they 
continue to gloss over the question of social and human meaning in legal systems, NLP 
researchers should expect justified neglect of their work by governments, law firms, 
businesses, and the legal academy.”).  
114 On the role of wisdom in law, see JEFF LIPSHAW, BEYOND LEGAL REASONING: A 
CRITIQUE OF PURE LAWYERING 158–62 (2017).  
115 DAVID DAYEN, CHAIN OF TITLE: HOW THREE ORDINARY AMERICANS UNCOVERED WALL 
STREET’S GREAT FORECLOSURE FRAUD (2016). 
116 This was unsurprising, given the rise of “robo-signing” as a fraudulent method of rapidly 
disposing of foreclosure cases. Jeff Harrington, 2010 Adds Its Own Terminology to Business 
Lexicon, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 23, 2010), http:// www.tampabay.com/news /business 
/2010-adds-its-own-terminology-to-business-lexicon/1141681. (“Robo- sign[ing involves] a 
back- office system of quickly signing off on foreclosure documents like affidavits without 
actually doing what the affidavits say was done.”). 
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wait for an app to parse their problems. For example, in New York, 
foreclosure notices often contained a warning that those served with them had 
to dispute the ownership of the property by the mortgagee (if they wished to 
do so) within twenty days of receiving the notice.117 A minimally competent 
lawyer working in this field would know that the status of a defense as either 
jurisdictional or waivable would be a matter of utmost urgency to the 
client.118 Sadly, basic terms like these are either unknown or unappreciated 
by many of the coders now aspiring to computerize legal advice. 
 Of course, few outside the foreclosure industry would endorse the 
severity of the twenty-day rule, or similar inflexibilities in legal systems. 
They are noted here to mark the extreme inappropriateness of many aspects 
of the Silicon Valley start-up mentality in contemporary legal practice.119  
The legal trade press—often funded by advertising dollars from legaltech 
firms—tends toward blanket characterizations of disruptive firms as a breath 
of fresh air for a stodgy legal profession.120 They gloss over the fact that good 
legal practice is built upon care, meticulousness, and proofreading because 
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Breaking the law, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/c3a9347e-fdb4-
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mistakes can be irreversible—filings have page limits,121 many issues not 
raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal,122 and in some situations even 
“actual innocence” is not enough to spare a wrongfully convicted inmate 
from the death penalty.123 
 
C. Blockchain as a Substitute for Property Recordation 
 
The persistence of bespoke contracts (and regulatory responses to 
them) is likely in the realm of high finance. Contracts are too complex and 
variable, and require too much human judgment, to be reliably coded into 
software. Code may reflect and in large part implement what the parties 
intended, but it cannot itself serve as the contract or business agreement 
among them.  
Still, some technologists and lawyers aspire to that subsumption, 
echoing older movements for financial deregulation.124 The rise of Bitcoin as 
an alternative currency has sparked an interest in automation of transactions 
and recordation.125 Software can allow distributed computers to transfer 
information en masse and monitor one another.126 Bitcoin is a particular case 
of using blockchain technology to ensure a durable record of ownership, 
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which is intended to be regulated by code.127 Blockchain enthusiasts envision 
it scaling en masse to serve as a distributed ledger of all manner of 
transactions. 
Consider a simple transaction: the transfer of title of a car. At present, 
this type of transfer may take a trip, in person, to the Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV), and filling out paperwork is a prerequisite for a valid 
transfer. 
 In the case of car titles, we can think of the DMV as a kind of bank: 
just as banks monitor when money has been deposited or spent, the DMV 
maintains a record of when, for any given person or legal entity, the 
ownership of a car begins or ends. Blockchain software could store, on 
distributed computers, a complete list of who owns which car, just as peer to 
peer file sharing software maintains a list of locations of where given (parts 
of) files are located. 128 Anyone can instantly transmit to all the other 
computers his desire to transfer ownership of his car to a willing buyer.129 
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The same system could also be programmed to coordinate the transmission 
of the seller’s “I’ve sold my car” signal with the seller’s “I’ve just deposited 
$5,000 in the buyer’s bank account” signal. Blockchain enthusiasts aim to 
render not just DMVs, but banks and other institutions of trust, obsolete.130 
While the computational processes here may be complex, their 
recordation function is relatively simple. Each transaction is modeled as a 
link in a chain, and the public ledgers at any given time reflect a “block” of 
all past transactions.131 Thus the name “Blockchain” boils down to a physical 
metaphor (a chain of blocks) for socio-technical arrangement. And we see 
glimmers of this kind of distributed trust already in software like Venmo, 
which runs on top of Facebook and allows instantaneous monetary transfers 
among friends.132 Finance apps that run on top of China’s WeChat messaging 
system are even more powerful and pervasive.133  A blockchain for 
                                                          
bitcoin users, all keep track of one another’s account balances on your own computers. The 
1.09 bitcoins you’d pay . . . is assembled into a ‘block’ with a few hundred transactions from 
other users. Every 10 minutes, a new block is added to the ‘chain’ of all transactions so far. 
Everyone who wants may keep a copy of the blockchain and can easily check it to see who 
has how many bitcoins. . . . [The goal is] secure, anonymous transfers of stocks, cars, houses, 
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130 The Promise of the Blockchain: The Trust Machine, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015) 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21677198-technology-behind-bitcoin-could-
transform-how-economy-works-trust-machine (“The spread of blockchains is bad for 
anyone in the “trust business”—the centralised institutions and bureaucracies, such as banks, 
clearing houses and government authorities that are deemed sufficiently trustworthy to 
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governmental entities] may not sound revolutionary or sexy. Neither did double-entry book-
keeping or joint-stock companies. Yet, like them, the blockchain is an apparently mundane 
process that has the potential to transform how people and businesses co-operate.”).  
131 NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN, supra note 128, at 5.  
132 Venmo, Sending and Requesting Money (Dec. 26, 2016), https://help.venmo.com/hc/en-
us/articles/210413477; Sylvan Lane, The Beginner’s Guide to Venmo, MASHABLE (June 30, 
2014), http://mashable.com/2014/06/30/venmo-beginners-guide/#HG2q8DXMrZq3; Ethan 
Wolff-Mann, The Scary Thing You Don’t Understand About Venmo, TIME (Dec. 27, 2016), 
https://time.com/money/4036511/venmo-more-check-than-cash/. 
133 Connie Chan, When One App Rules Them All: The Case of WeChat and Mobile in China, 
A16Z.COM (Aug. 6, 2015), https://a16z.com/2015/08/06/wechat-china-mobile-first/ 
(describing the WeChat Wallet menu as a site of “1) built-in trust since designated partners 
have been vetted and selected by Tencent, as well as 2) automatic authentication of identity 
and payment, and 3) the ability to offer seamless experiences with third parties while never 
requiring the user to leave the WeChat app.”).  
37 
 
transferring title could essentially amount to a digital key.134 Once the owner 
was recognized by the system as a whole, that system’s assent to his locking 
or unlocking his car would seem to be more robust than physical keys (which 
can be lost) or keychain signal transmitters (which break easily). A series of 
numbers, verified by the public ledger, would be the new “key” to ownership 
or access. 
Given enthusiasm expressed for blockchain at the highest levels of 
international finance and the federal government,135 states may soon explore 
replacing the title transfer function of their DMVs with a blockchain-based, 
public ledger of ownership transactions. Such a digital transition would cut 
out a fair number of annoying, time-consuming trips. Some state workers 
would lose their jobs—but most do not seem all that enthusiastic to be 
pushing paper in windowless warrens. Using technology to modernize 
transactions would seem to be a huge opportunity for politicians eager to both 
save personnel costs and reduce inconvenience for constituents.136  
Yet there are also reasons for caution. Blockchain advocates have not 
fully clarified what happens if someone ignores computational descriptions 
of legal reality. For example, imagine if the seller above simply fails to 
deliver the car. Can the buyer call the police to seize the car? Must the buyer 
                                                          
134 Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 404 (2016); 
Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. ONLINE 35, 38–39 (2014) (“If financial transactions can be freed of banks as 
intermediaries, then contracts can be freed of courts as intermediaries.”). 
135 World Economic Forum, The Future of Financial Infrastructure: An Ambitious Look at 
How Blockchain Can Reshape Financial Services (Aug. 2016), http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/WEF_The_future_of_financial_infrastructure.pdf; South African Reserve Bank, 
Position Paper on Virtual Currencies (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.resbank.co.za/
RegulationAndSupervision/NationalPaymentSystem(NPS)/Legal/Documents/Position%20
Paper/Virtual%20Currencies%20Position%20Paper%20%20Final_02of2014.pdf; see also 
David Mills et al., Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing and Settlement, 
Federal Reserve Board (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/
feds/2016/files/2016095pap.pdf. 
136 STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFORD, THE RESPONSIVE CITY: ENGAGING 
COMMUNITIES THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE 120 (2014) (describing an automated 
process for collecting city data across agencies that “greatly improved in-house analytic 
capacity for several agencies . . . radically changing the city’s way of doing business”); BETH 
NOVECK, SMART CITIZENS, SMARTER STATE 106 (2015) (“[T]he processes of matching the 
supply of expertise to the demand for it within organizations is becoming more automated in 
the twenty-first century.”). 
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file a lien? If the buyer does file suit, is the state of the public ledger 
conclusive evidence of the transfer? 
The lawyer/coder James Grimmelmann and Arvind Narayanan 
(coauthor of one of the leading textbooks on blockchain technology) have 
raised these questions in a brief but devastating critique of the fragility of 
distributed ledgers.137 If a hacker manages to copy the number-series used by 
a car’s owner, the hacker might easily transfer both the car—and the record 
of who owns it—to someone else.138 In other words: while legal automation 
giveth, it also taketh away.  The normal car title recordation system can be 
tiresomely meticulous and redundant, but it also offers resilience.139 A state 
database is a record of ownership distinct from the blockchain. So even if 
automated title transfer became popular, it would seem necessary to keep 
some official backup.140 
 Despite such problems, there is still enormous enthusiasm for more 
widespread adoption of legal technology. Part of this enthusiasm stems from 
investors looking for new sectors to conquer. Venture capitalist Marc 
Andreessen spoke for many when he hoped, in the Wall Street Journal, for 
software to “eat the world”—that is, for programs (and robots animated by 
them) to perform tasks once done by humans.141 A good number of lawyers 
                                                          
137 Grimmelmann & Nayaranan, The Blockchain Gang, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/02/bitcoin_s_blockchain_tech
nology_won_t_change_everything.html. 
138 Id. (“[I]f a hacker gets access to your computer and can read your digital key, he’s home 
free because he can transfer the car on the blockchain to a key that he controls.”). 
139 Id. (“There is a trade-off in any system of property law. You can have hard rules: simple, 
cheap, and clear-cut. Or you can have soft rules: flexible case-by-case responses to 
unanticipated messes. . . . Blockchains are the hardest property technology ever made. 
They’re impervious to dumb mistakes, like DMV clerks mistyping a vehicle identification 
number or losing your papers behind the radiator. But they’re so hard they’re brittle.). 
140 Id.  
141 Marc Andreessen, Why Software is Eating the World, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2011; 
Mariano Florentino Cuellar, Deciding Whether Software Will Eat the Bureaucracy, 
REGBLOG (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.regblog.org/2016/12/22/cuellar-deciding-software-
eat-bureaucracy/ (“Lawyers and policymakers will almost certainly need to adjust their 
approaches to using automation in the administrative state. . . . At its core, the administrative 
state is about reconciling calculations of social welfare with procedural constraints. It is an 
enterprise that pivots in subtle and profound ways on human institutions, assumptions, and 
aspirations—however imperfectly fulfilled—for deliberation.”). In both cases, the metaphor 
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share that enthusiasm. That may seem odd—who wants to be replaced by a 
machine?142 One reason is a classic desire of one part of the profession to 
assert a kind of superiority over the rest.143 Some are prone to view the 
practice of law with detachment and disdain, presuming it to be a rote and 
formalistic affair easily boiled down to a set of programmable propositions. 
Combine that condescension with contrived but powerful business 
imperatives to “reduce legal spend,” and the legaltech revolution always 
seems near at hand. 
Thus there is a steady drumbeat of articles proposing distributed 
ledgers for a wide variety of applications in law. Some propose blockchain 
technology as a way for businesses to maintain a ledger for timekeeping, 
billing, financial transactions, and other records—a modest step that does not 
implicate the types of coordination and interoperability problems discussed 
above.144 Michael Abramowicz’s Cryptocurrency-Based Law outlines an 
ambitious vision for using blockchain applications to coordinate endeavors 
now organized via law.145 Rather than voting shares in meetings, participants 
in an organization could bid with BitCoins to promote one course of action 
over others.146  One of the great appeals of blockchain, as opposed to other 
software, is its supposedly immutable character—that is, its resistance to 
being altered once its parameters have been coded.147 Automobile lenders 
have already introduced the basic foundations of such technology: when 
                                                          
of transformation as “eating” business or bureaucracy should spur reflection on what happens 
to food once it is digested. 
142 Indeed, at the beginning of legal education in America, Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe 
Pound lamented what he called “mechanical jurisprudence,” suggesting that only a nuanced 
view of social science and social reality could legitimate the imposition of regulation. Roscoe 
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). 
143 See, e.g., Daniel Martin Katz, The MIT School of Law: A Perspective on Legal Education 
in the 21st Century, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1431 (attempting to appropriate the prestige of 
technical education for courses focused on legal technology). 
144 Victor Li, Bitcoin’s Useful Backbone, 102 A.B.A. J. 31, 31 (Mar. 2016). 
145 Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 404 (2016) 
146 Id. at 391. 
147 Id. at 373; DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE 
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD (2016). 
For skepticism about claims of immutability, see Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain 
Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 713 (2016-2017).   
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payments are late, a “starter interrupt device” can disable a debtor’s car.148 
The payment of funds held in escrow could also be “self-executing,” once 
some code-specified trigger was tripped.149 Trust law could also enable peer-
to-peer decision making processes to reduce transaction costs for 
disbursements.150 Abramowicz even foresees the spread of blockchain to 
investment firms,151 both for core business purposes, and to engage in 
regulatory arbitrage.152 He also sees a role for blockchain applications in 
insurance.153  
Legal scholars have also prescribed potential blockchain-enabled 
management of micropayments.154 In the past, when Congress realized that 
new technology would lead to widespread copying, it imposed a small fee per 
copy—a practice known as compulsory licensing.155 This regime, still in 
place for many works, separates compensation (for works) from control (over 
their use).156 For blockchain advocates, software could take on the role of 
                                                          
148 Jathan Sadowski & Frank Pasquale, Creditors Use New Devices to Put Squeeze on 
Debtors, AL JAZEERA AM. (Nov. 9, 2014) (“There is no escaping debt collectors who can, 
with the push of a button on their smartphones, disable your car until you cough up 
payment.”).  
149 Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, supra note 145, at 405–06. 
150 Id. at 408-9; see also Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and 
the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 257 (2014). 
151 Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, supra note 145, at 411. 
152 Id. at 412; see also Danielle Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1484–85 (2011) (stating that 
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153 Michael Abramowicz, Cryptoinsurance, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 705 (2015). 
Abramowicz believes that insurance companies can sell insurance using a cryptocurrency, 
based on smart contracts that authorize transactions based on a third party or voting process. 
Id. at 705–06. Abramowicz also argues that attempts to regulate cryptoinsurance would be 
subject to many of the difficulties in regulating cryptocurrency; however the article does 
offer possible directions for regulation such as simply banning the practice, or by making 
cryptoinsurance redundant or unnecessary by mandating other forms of insurance. Id. at 706–
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154 See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 831 (2015). 
155 Salil Mehra, The iPod Tax: Why the Digital Copyright System of American Law 
Professors’ Dreams Failed in Japan, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 421 (2008). 
156 WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT (2007). Fisher has offered a detailed and compelling proposal to subsidize 
culture by lightly taxing the technology that leads to its uncompensated duplication. 
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law—artists could make their work exclusively available via blockchain 
applications, setting their own rates for downloads or streams of copyrighted 
works.157 The ultimate promise here is to set up systems of content 
distribution that balance commercial imperatives and creative freedoms in a 
more nimble manner than current law.158 
Framed as parts of an existing legal system, all of these proposals 
disclose promising applications of social software. However, they are 
occasionally promoted as a substitute for the legal system itself. That 
substitution would reflect not merely the algorithmic application of rules, but 
the values of other human beings trusted as participants in governance, and 
not merely as appliers of technical rules. Engineers with little or no domain 
expertise in the legal profession cannot code software designed to replace that 
governance, and those with such domain expertise would be wise to decline 
to do so, as the next section shows. 
 
D. The Inescapability of Governance 
 
Though sober reports from the World Economic Forum, Deloitte, and 
governmental entities give a good sense of the incrementalist side of fintech, 
much of the excitement about the topic of financial technology arises out of 
a more futuristic perspective. On Twitter, hashtags like #legaltech, #regtech, 
#insurtech, and #fintech often convene enthusiasts who aspire to 
revolutionize the financial landscape—or at least to make a good deal of  
money disrupting existing “trust institutions” (e.g., the intermediaries which 
help store and transfer financial assets).  
For many advocates of cryptocurrencies, the blockchain’s 
cryptography is celebrated as a democratization of encryption.159 Given their 
distributed nature, blockchains are also touted as way to create an alternative 
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legal system, beyond the reach of traditional legal authorities.160 Ironically, 
the same celebrations of the power of blockchain applications also tend to 
worry that premature regulation could limit the impact of blockchains.161 
They should clarify whether any programs really are “unstoppable,” or 
whether regulation and force could stifle them. 
Immutability is the main characteristic of blockchain that is supposed 
to set it apart from past social software, and enable it to replace, rather than 
merely operate as an adjunct to, existing legal systems.162 Those accepting 
the terms of the relevant code are assured that, whatever happens to the rest 
of the world in the future, their transactions are guaranteed to be valid. 
Are blockchains really capable of preventing hacking or tampering? 
Short of a fortified HAL 9000 terminating would-be hackers before they 
could access the relevant blockchains, it is hard to imagine such assurances 
being verifiable.163 When billed as a replacement for law or lawyers, code 
immediately runs into both conceptual and practical difficulties.  
Moreover, some early adopters of this ideal of self-executing or coded 
law have experienced troubling and telling failures.164  Investors in a 
“decentralized autonomous organization” (DAO) run on code have already 
experienced the turbulent and troubling aspects of software-governed legal 
orders. In early 2016, a hacker managed to take millions of dollars in a 
fashion unanticipated by the drafters of the code governing the 
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organization.165 The main organizer of the DAO, Vitalik Buterin, then was 
able to retaliate because the code only enabled the withdrawal of funds after 
a 27-day waiting period. 166 He coded a “hard fork” for the organization, 
which essentially shifted funds from the hacker’s account to an account 
where the original investors in the project could withdraw their funds.167  
 According to Buterin and other organizers of the DAO, this 
intervention was a success story: it proved the recoverability of their system. 
But for advocates of legal automation, this was a Pyrrhic victory. The post 
hoc intervention violated the principle of autonomy supposedly at the core of 
the DAO.168 Persons managed the smart contract—not mere code.169 In other 
words, the only way the supposedly smart, incorruptible, automated, and 
immutable contract actually protected investors was by allowing human 
intervention to change its terms and consequences. Rather than 
demonstrating the dispensability of human interventions, the DAO has 
proved the opposite—the vital necessity of human governance over even 
                                                          
165 See Michael del Castillo, The DAO: Or How a Leaderless Ethereum Project Raised $50 
Million, COINDESK (May 12, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/the-dao-just-raised-50-
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extensively coded and computerized forms of human cooperation. And this 
governance, to the extent it was legitimate, could only be known to be so, 
thanks to the explanation offered by the DAO’s sponsors—an explanation 
made in language, not code. 
Blockchain enthusiasts need to directly address these concerns before 
promoting further substitutive automation of law. It is tempting to view 
software as an all-purpose way of dispatching with middlemen like lawyers 
and banks. But, as James Grimmelmann observed in 2005, “software is 
vulnerable to sudden failure, software is hackable, and software is not 
robust.”170 No technology has developed that would make the blockchain 
environment impervious to these problems.171 Indeed, precisely the opposite 
is true: waves of hacking and illicit intrusions have rocked health care 
institutions,172 banks,173 and even campaigns174 and governments.175 
The question of vulnerabilities is critical to defining the normative 
core and legal standing of blockchain projects. For example, in the DAO 
incident mentioned above, some argued that the hacker was the one who truly 
understood the spirit of blockchain, because the hacker’s actions were 
allowed under the coding of the DAO.176 If the real core of blockchain is 
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unstoppable automation via code, then the hacker should be allowed to keep 
the funds taken. Reversing the hacking is a reflection of values outside the 
smart contract, as it existed at the time the hack happened. Those are legal 
and political values that need to be fully articulated: who gets to be part of 
the decisionmaking cadre? Is it a Wikipedia-style project of collaboration 
structured by hierarchy?177 If so, is there anything to learn from Wikipedia’s 
problems and limits?178 Do Blockchain projects’ commitments to 
decentralization have to yield when certain problems in smart contracts are 
exposed? If so, how are these “constitutional moments” (to apply Bruce 
Ackerman’s constitutionalist term of art to digitized law) recognizable?179  
The problem of “irreversibility” also needs to be clarified as to its 
technical and legal dimensions. Does it mean that 1) legal rules or contracts 
will preclude blockchain-connected parties from availing themselves of the 
legal system? Or 2) is there something inherent in the code that makes 
reversibility much harder?  Or 3) is the code, at present, a way of evading or 
avoiding legal re-examination of the transaction, and could eventually be 
reformed to make the transactions more amenable to legal reversibility?  
Possibilities 1 and 3 would be a reassuring message—but would also 
undermine blockchain enthusiasts’ claims about the novelty of blockchain 
scenarios (since 1 is already a standard part of consumer contracts 
disclaiming liability, and 3 is a problem that has faced regulators for at least 
a decade). 
 There is also a basic conflict over the nomenclature of blockchain 
projects. They can either be public and permissionless, or private and 
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permissioned.180 Major banks, government institutions, and global forums 
tend to promote private and permissioned blockchains. This distinction is 
critical because, at present, the private/permissioned and 
public/permissionless schools of blockchain appear to be trading off one 
another’s distinctive appeal. For example, high-level banking managers style 
themselves as tribunes of the people for advancing blockchain, pointing to 
the idealistic impulses of the public/permissionless school.181 Meanwhile, 
those advocating public/permissionless blockchains try to demonstrate just 
how serious and pragmatic they are by highlighting support for the 
technology among high-level government officials and business leaders. The 
two groups are actually talking about very different phenomena—and 
scholarly work should illuminate that tension, rather than trying to downplay 
it in the name of preserving unity in the blockchain community. 
When De Filippi and Hassan speak of the “incorporation of legal rules 
into code” and “regulation by code,” culminating in a reliance on code “not 
only to enforce legal rules, but also to draft and elaborate these rules,” they 
do not present these phenomena as unalloyed goods.182 Rather, they are 
cautious about the “the prospect of automated legal governance” because it 
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Technology: From Code Is Law to Law Is Code, 21 FIRST MONDAY no. 12 (Dec. 4, 2016); 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/7113; see also Aaron Wright & 
Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex 
Cryptographia (Mar. 10, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2580664. 
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may “reduce the freedoms and autonomy of individuals.”183 The answer to 
these concerns is not to double down on the translation of legal rules into 
code. Rather, the preservation of human control over legal systems will 
require an alternative paradigm—a vision of software as a tool to assist 
persons, rather than a machine replacing them. Nor should policymakers 
abandon long-standing principles of financial regulation to make way for 
forms of financial automation that have yet to be proven. There is little 
evidence that regulation means their “revolutionary promise” would be lost, 
as it was probably never there in the first place.184 
 
III. PROMOTING COMPLEMENTARY AUTOMATION IN LAW 
 
For many legal futurists, substitutive automation—the rise of robot 
lawyers to replace current associates and partners—is the long-term goal of 
legal technology.185 They see early advances in this direction—such as a 
chatbot to dispute parking tickets—as part of a general trend toward a “rise 
of the robots” in 21st century political economy.186 This technologically 
determined narrative of progress reflects a larger movement among 
economists and engineers to cast human labor itself as a thing of the past, 
                                                          
183 Id. 
184 ADAM GREENFIELD, RADICAL TECHNOLOGIES 303 (2017) (“the inventors of the 
blockchain overtly intended to erode statism and central administration. Virtually 
everywhere, decision algorithms are touted to us on the promise that they will permanently 
displace human subjectivity and bias. And yet in every instance we find that these ambitions 
are flouted, as the technologies that were supposed to enact them are captured…by existing 
concentrations of power.).  
185 Paul F. Kirgis, The Knowledge Guild: The Legal Profession in an Age of Technological 
Change, 11 NEV. L.J. 184, 184 (2010) (“Susskind offers no evidence to support his claim that 
greater automation of legal work will result in less demand for human legal services. In fact, 
the evidence suggests that productivity increases in knowledge industries increase demand 
for those knowledge goods.”). 
186 See FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS, supra note 10. 
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ideally replaced by a full automation of present jobs.187 But this is just one 
vision of human progress—and not a very attractive one.188  
The legal futurists’ partial vision of economic progress reflects a 
similarly incomplete normative account of the rule of law—one that asks both 
too much, and too little, of legal institutions. Whatever other normative goals 
judges and regulators pursue, they should adhere to the rule of law. Richard 
Fallon has observed that there are at least three distinct ideal-typical accounts 
of the rule of law in contemporary jurisprudence.189 Legal automators tend to 
focus on historicist accounts (which associate the rule of law with “rule by 
norms laid down by legitimate lawmaking authorities prior to their 
application to particular cases”) and formalism (which defines “the ideal if 
not necessary form of ‘law’” as “that of a ‘rule,’ conceived as a clear 
prescription that exists prior to its application and that determines appropriate 
conduct or legal outcomes.”).190 Were federal health privacy regulation really 
reducible to “requirements extraction” encoded in software, that encoding 
would amount to a real advance for the rule of law, in its historicist and 
formalist conceptions. The law would be as executable as a software 
command. Similarly, the translation of traffic rules into a series of chatbot 
prompts renders the law into a crystalline form—if not application. 
Nevertheless, there is another account of the rule of law, a “Legal 
Process conception,” which is more expansive, and more recently developed, 
than either the historicist or formalist accounts.191 As Fallon explains:  
                                                          
187 RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN 
INTELLIGENCE (2000); see also NICK SRNICEK & ALEX WILLIAM, INVENTING THE FUTURE: 
POSTCAPITALISM AND A WORLD WITHOUT WORK (2015).  
188 Frank Pasquale, Two Concepts of Immortality: Reframing Public Debate on Stem-Cell 
Research, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 75 (2002) (critiquing the “downloading” of memory, 
intellect, and will onto hardware or software). 
189 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (describing these “ideal types as (i) historicist, (ii) formalist, (iii) 
Legal Process, and (iv) substantive”). For our purposes, the concrete requirements of the 
substantive approach are not relevant; the first three suffice to demonstrate the diversity of 
conceptions of the rule of law, which demonstrate the legal futurists’ partiality. 
190 Id. at 11–17. 
191 Id. at 18. The term Legal Process here denotes the approach of a school of jurisprudence 
that emerged in the mid-twentieth century United States in order to reconcile realist and 
formalist approaches to interpretation. Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal 
Procedure: Two Cheers for the Legal Process School, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 125, 126 
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Legal Process conceptions find the requisites of "law" necessary for 
the Rule of Law to be satisfied by a mixture of (i) procedural fairness 
in the development and application of legal norms, (ii) an (assumed) 
internal connection between notions of law and reasonableness, (iii) 
reasoned elaboration of the connection between recognized, pre-
existing sources of legal authority and the determination of rights and 
responsibilities in particular cases, and (iv) judicial review as a 
guarantor of procedural fairness and rational deliberation by 
legislative, executive, and administrative decisionmakers.192 
 
This elaborate definition may seem awkward in comparison with the 
relatively compact accounts of the historicist and formalist schools. While 
those approaches emphasis the “rule” side of the rule of law, the Legal 
Process approach emphasizes “law” as its core component. Law as a social 
institution is multi-faceted and embedded in particular political systems and 
traditions, such as rights to appeal and explanations for decisions. To the 
extent a legal technology like a smart contract reduces a legal relationship to 
a “clear prescription that exists prior to its application and that determines 
appropriate conduct or legal outcomes” (exemplifying the formalist 
conception of the rule of law), it is unlikely to meet the complex standards of 
review and appeal embodied in the Legal Process conception of the rule of 
law.193  
When conflicts over interpretation arise, the Legal Process approach 
to the rule of law demands the clashing parties are offered “reasoned 
elaboration of the connection between recognized, pre-existing sources of 
legal authority and the determination of rights and responsibilities in 
                                                          
(2005); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 20 (1998) 
(describing emergence of the Legal Process school.). 
192 Id. at 18. Fallon’s list of aspects of Legal Process conceptions of the rule of law is drawn 
from the locus classicus of the Legal Process approach. Id. (citing HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 4–5, 152–53, 157–58, 695 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994)). 
193 Id. at 18. 
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particular cases”—not simple disposition of their cases via code.194 Nor do 
ad hoc interventions, like those pursued after the DAO hack discussed above, 
guarantee the “procedural fairness and rational deliberation” contemplated by 
a Legal Process conception of the rule of law.195 One-sided deployments of 
vastly superior legal-technological resources also undermine the types of 
dialogue and fair play valued by the Legal Process school. 
Fallon has called for the integration of the many strands of meaning 
in “the rule of law” tradition into a robust hybrid theory that reflects the 
strengths of each.196 Inspired by his approach, this Part develops principles 
to guide the future of legal automation in a way that cultivates and develops, 
rather than discounts and devalues, attorneys’ skills.  
 
A. Intelligence Augmentation as Regulative Ideal 
 
The right tools make a job far easier—and even engaging. For 
example, a truck driver may find that cruise control frees his foot from the 
gas pedal for time to stretch and relieve cramps.197 Automatic transmission 
makes it easier to shift from high to low gear.198 Collision avoidance software 
can warn him about cars in his blind spot.199 Technology can make the job 
much easier—until it replaces the driver altogether.200 There may be a 
delicate balance between inventions that help a worker, and those which 
replace the worker altogether. Nevertheless, economists recognize this 
distinction as fundamental to valuation, calling the former a complement to 
labor, and the latter, a substitute for it.201 
                                                          
194 Id. at 19. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 54–55. 
197 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC & SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL AUTOMATED 
VEHICLES POLICY 9 (2016) (describing the SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) 
International levels of autonomy in driving). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 
120 (13th ed. 2015) (describing complements and substitutes). 
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 In computing, artificial intelligence (AI) research has focused on 
technologies that can substitute for human cognition and attention.202 For 
example, even in the 1960s, roboticists at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology were developing mechanical sentries to relieve soldiers of the 
boring and dangerous duty of standing guard at vulnerable sites.203 But there 
is another way of thinking of the sentry robot—not as AI replacing troops, 
but as one more tool to increase their effectiveness. Rather than viewing its 
infantry or guards as mere drones, to be dispatched as quickly as a new tool 
mimics a critical mass of their functions, a military may invest in its personnel 
as skilled operators of increasingly sophisticated machines. Sensors and 
computers may be designed to act as a second set of eyes and ears, rapidly 
processing threat levels and other data to better inform soldiers’ actions. This 
is a type of intelligence augmentation (IA), which has informed far more 
projects than AI.204 
 The friendly rivalry between AI and IA researchers casts a new light 
on policy debates over the future of automation in law. Software is frequently 
unable to provide the full arrange of services and protections offered by 
attorneys.205 Nevertheless, federal policymakers have recently menaced 
states which attempt to enforce clear distinctions between automated legal 
advice and direct counsel from an attorney. For example, when North 
Carolina attempted to modernize its regulation of software-based legal 
services, the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice weighed 
in to criticize the state and threaten antitrust action against it.206 Framed as an 
                                                          
202 JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LOVING GRACE xii (2015). 
203 Id. at 5. 
204 Id. at 16. 
205 Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal Services, 
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1825 (describing how premature disruptions occur when “an 
industry has experienced a diminution in its capacity or willingness to meet demand for a 
core function at pre-disruption levels of quality, leading to a reduction in welfare that exceeds 
the benefits brought by the innovation,” and applying this theory of premature disruption to 
legal services).  
206 Letter from Marina Lao, Dir. of the FTC Office of Policy Planning & Robert Potter, Chief 
of the Legal Policy Section, Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to N.C. Sen. Bill Cook 
(June 10, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/
comment-federal-trade-commission-staff-antitrust-division-addressing-north-carolina-
house-bill-436/160610commentncbill.pdf. 
52 
 
attack on attorney self-protection, the agencies’ intervention had flimsy 
foundations in economic policy, and evidenced little to no awareness of 
literature on the pitfalls of automation.207 They appear committed to 
promoting software as a substitute for attorneys, even though the sellers of 
such software often foist exculpatory clauses (or other limitations of liability) 
on end users.208 Such clauses prematurely extinguish litigation over bad 
outcomes, which could help both attorneys and consumers better understand 
the risks involved in AI approaches to law.209 At the very least, federal 
antitrust policymakers should promote state bans on such clauses, in order to 
provide a more level playing field in the legal services market. 
 Computer science researchers should also be more open to viewing 
the indeterminacy and flexibility of law as features best handled by human 
(rather than algorithmic) approaches. In early iterations of expert systems, 
programmers attempted to translate the rules governing professionals’ 
demonstrations of expertise into pseudocode, and then software.210 There 
were some successes in law, but the expert system approach never became 
widespread. In both transactional and litigation contexts, it was almost 
impossible for any truly knowledgeable professional to boil down the sum 
total of their knowledge and judgment into a series of propositions applicable 
by machine.211 This resistance of human know-how to codification and 
                                                          
207 Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism: Reappraising 
Occupational Licensure and Competition Policy, ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 7 (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2881732 (criticizing the FTC for 
failing to take into account important consumer protection goals in its complaints about 
occupational licensure restrictions). 
208 See, e.g., H.B. 436, 2015-2016 Sess. (N.C. 2016) (North Carolina 2016 law exempting 
certain website providers from the definition of the “practice of law” and creating additional 
requirements for website providers). 
209 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 139–40 (2014) (describing suboptimal social outcomes arising out of 
exculpatory clauses). 
210 HUBERT DREYFUS, STUART E. DREYFUS & TOM ATHANASIOU, MIND OVER MACHINE: 
THE POWER OF HUMAN INTUITION AND EXPERTISE IN THE ERA OF THE COMPUTER (1986). 
211 Id. at 11 (“Problems involving deep understanding built up on the basis of vast experience 
will not yield—as do simple, well-defined problems that exist in isolation from much of 
human experience—to formal mathematical or computer analysis.”); id. at 81 (“[T]he sheer 
number of lawyers in business tells us that it is impossible to banish ambiguity and judgment 
by specifying a code of law so complete that all situations are specified and prejudged.”).  
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standardization persists in many contexts far less complex than legal practice 
is today. For example, the economist David Autor argues that even in the next 
decade or so, it is highly unlikely that the replacement of a windshield on a 
car could be fully automated, even if driving itself is.212 
 
B. Preserving Articulable Standards in an Age of Rules and Brute Force 
Prediction 
 
  The appeal of pervasive legal automation is based on a certain 
conception of the rule of law, and of a legal duty to pursue a type of utility 
maximization. Many critics of courts complain that judges simply list 
multiple factors to consider, and then offer some gestalt opinion, without 
properly distinguishing contrary authority or otherwise reasoning from first 
principles to a decision.213 The obvious reform response within the law is to 
try to develop some kind of rule to make clear what decisions should be based 
on. So, for instance, after Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid,214 a 
leading case on the “independent contractor/employee” distinction in 
                                                          
212 David Autor, Polanyi’s Paradox and the Shape of Employment Growth 31 (NBER 
Working Paper No. 20485, Sept. 2014) (“Modern automobile plants, for example, employ 
industrial robots to install windshields on new vehicles as they move through the assembly 
line. But aftermarket windshield replacement companies employ technicians, not robots, to 
install replacement windshields. Why not robots? Because removing a broken windshield, 
preparing the windshield frame to accept a replacement, and fitting a replacement into that 
frame demand far more real-time adaptability than any contemporary robot can approach.”); 
David H. Autor, Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of the 
Workplace Automation, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2015). 
213 Meredith Hayward, Reasonable Notice Periods Still Not ‘One Size Fits All’, LITIGATOR 
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.thelitigator.ca/2011/03/reasonable-notice-periods-still-not-one-
size-fits-all/; William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 
67–68 (2008) (“[M]ost trademark infringement cases turn on the application of a complex 
multifactor test. . . . Unfortunately, this approach is both unpredictable and time-
consuming.”); Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: 
Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 
1308 (2012) (“These multifactor tests are deeply flawed. They support an open-ended and 
relatively subjective approach that generates serious litigation uncertainty, chills beneficial 
uses of marks, and supports socially problematic expansions of trademark law.”). 
214 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) (“In determining whether a hired party is an employee under 
the general common law of agency, we consider [over 10 factors]. No one of these factors is 
determinative.”) (internal citations omitted).  
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copyright law, many law review articles tried to isolate payment of payroll 
taxes as the touchstone, despite the multi-factor test in the case.215 More 
ambitious articles might try to explain variations with elaborate sub-rules, as 
treatise writers are prone to typologize cases.216 
Despite the ambitions of the systematizers, there are almost always 
conflicts among the approaches of multiple courts to similar sets of facts, 
irreconcilable by logic or reason. For partisans of predictive analytics in law, 
when there is no real rule of decision integrating factors in a reasoned way, 
the methods of natural language processing may take aspects of past cases 
(such as the filings), model the effects of various phrases or structures of the 
documents on the decisionmaker, and then extrapolate those effects in future 
cases on the basis of their filings.  
To the extent it applies these methods as the optimal way of bringing 
order to a confusing area of law, the best way a firm can advise clients is to 
have as many fact situations in its database as possible, match their facts to 
all the extant facts, and perform brute predictions of what the judges will do. 
This form of prediction is much like weather forecasters using big data (rather 
than underlying atmospheric dynamics) to predict the movement of storms.217 
An algorithmic analysis of a database of, say, 1,000 cold fronts with a given 
atmospheric pressure sweeping over Michigan, may (with proper parameters 
and algorithms) prove a better predictor of the next cold front’s effects than 
a trained meteorologist without access to such a data trove.218 
These methods also mirror advances in translation accomplished by 
Google over the past decade. Google translate does not deploy some 
                                                          
215 See Julie Goldscheid, Copyright Law: Toward an Improved “Works for Hire” Doctrine, 
1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557 (1991).  
216 See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:53 (2016); 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, 
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 4:9 (2016).  
217 This may either exemplify or solve Bentham’s complaints about overcomplexity of law. 
FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015). See also Blue J Legal, Bardal Factors, 
What’s Reasonable?, http://www.bardalfactors.ca/whats-reasonable/; Samuel Gibbs, 
Chatbot Lawyer Overturns 160,000 Parking Tickets in London and New York, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/28/chatbot-
ai-lawyer-donotpay-parking-tickets-london-new-york]. 
218 PHAEDRA DAIPHA, MASTERS OF UNCERTAINTY: WEATHER FORECASTERS AND THE QUEST 
FOR GROUND TRUTH 51 (2016) (describing the project of “employing the brute force of 
computers to mathematically simulate the laws of atmospheric physics.”).   
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hierarchical set of rules to convert a word or phrase or sentence from one 
language to another. Rather, it simply tries to match the phrase to be 
converted to an identical or similar phrase in an extant, translated document, 
and then finds the matching phrase in the translation of that document to use 
it in the target context.219 Google’s translation program is not parsing the 
meaning of the words it translates. Rather, it is indexing past, human 
translations and matching them to current targets. In harder translations, it 
may well be extrapolating how best to meld divergent translations—but it 
relies on human responses to determine which are better, or worse, 
translations.220  
Far from being conflicting approaches to automating legal analysis, 
expert systems and machine learning approaches based on predictive 
analytics are deeply complementary methods of advancing substitutive 
automation in law. Once predictive analysts take a distant reading of cases,221 
treating the decisionmaker as a black box that takes in inputs (fact patterns) 
and generates outputs (judgments), with little clear sense of how input turned 
into output, there is pressure to formalize the system.222 Persons rightly 
demand some sense of why an outcome occurred. But the more formalized 
law becomes, the easier it is to convert its rules to the types of expert systems 
deployed in a program like TurboTax. 
Thus legal automation software may have an advantage over human 
attorneys in extreme scenarios. If law in an area is a complete mess, 
                                                          
219 See How Google Translate Works, GOOGLE SYSTEM BLOG (Aug. 12, 2010), 
http://googlesystem.blogspot.com/2010/08/how-google-translate-works.html; see also 
Tomas Mikolov et al., Distributed Representations of Words and Phrases and Their 
Compositionality, 2013 ADV. NEURAL INFO. PROC. SYSTEMS 3111 (describing the use of 
language vectors to improve Google Translate); DAVID BELLOS, IS THAT A FISH IN YOUR 
EAR?: TRANSLATION AND THE MEANING OF EVERYTHING 255 (2011). 
220 Google Translate Community, FAQ, GOOGLE, https://docs.google.com/document/
d/1dwS4CZzgZwmvoB9pAx4A6Yytmv7itk_XE968RMiqpMY/pub (last visited Jan. 12, 
2017) (“While Google Translate is a statistical machine translation tool . . . , we sometimes 
need help from native speakers to improve our algorithms . . . .”). 
221 FRANCO MORETTI, DISTANT READING 32 (2013) (describing an alternative to textual 
hermeneutics, which relies on the aggregation of data from hundreds or thousands of texts). 
222 Anthony Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards (U. of Chicago, 
Public Law Working Paper No. 550, Nov. 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693826##; Katz, supra note 12. 
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algorithmic analyses may find patterns in cases beyond human 
comprehension, and successfully brute force a prediction of optimal legal 
strategy.223 If the law, by contrast, is perfectly ordered, an expert system can 
reduce it to a series of rules to be applied.224 Fortunately for human attorneys, 
most living areas of law fit neither description—nor should they. Between 
the crystalline clarity of rules and the chaos of unconstrained discretion, there 
are articulable standards that help us formulate convincing explanations and 
justifications of legal decisionmaking, without foreordaining outcomes in 
advance. 
Businesses may complain about courts or agencies failing to articulate 
a clear rule for applying a statute or rule before a complaint or enforcement 
action is lodged against them.225 But this battle was lost in the 1940s.226 As 
the Supreme Court decided in Chenery II, there is "a very definite place for 
the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards.”227 A humane legal order, 
flexibly adapting to new realities and political change, demands nothing less.  
                                                          
223 Even in this scenario, though, hard ethical questions arise about the potential use of such 
programs. See Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the 
Jurisprudence of Behaviorism, U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (“The pragmatic and 
the critical uses of predictive algorithms [in law] are deeply in tension. An analyst may reveal 
biases in judgments, such as legally irrelevant details that somehow seem to be correlated 
with, and perhaps even driving, decisions. The same analyst may sell the predictive tool to 
attorneys or courts, as a case selection or triage tool. But precisely to the extent past training 
data reflect bias, they are likely to reinforce and spread the influence of that bias when they 
are utilized by actors outside the judicial system (who may, for example, not even try to 
advocate for a particular class of meritorious cases, since decisionmakers are systematically 
biased against them).”).  
224 However, it is also important to acknowledge that the process of articulating a rule may 
not improve decisionmaking. Chad Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the 
Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1386 (2008). 
225 Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule-Following Argument, 3 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 187 
(1990). 
226 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“Not 
every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast 
immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own 
development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In 
performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must 
be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.”). 
227 Id. at 202–03 (“In other words, problems may arise in a case which the administrative 
agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of 
a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a 
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Even weather forecasting—an exemplar of so much of the predictive 
modeling that motivates efforts to automate law—has recognized the 
ineradicable importance of human judgment, as sociologist Phaedra Daipha 
observes:  
 
The official NWS [National Weather Service] rhetoric . . . is replete 
with reductionist language and technocratic buzzwords, while 
forecasters readily subscribe to a naively positivist vision of 
science—even when, or precisely because, they keep an ironic 
distance from it. On the other hand, NWS operational guidelines 
explicitly and repeatedly leave it to forecasters’ judgment and 
discretion how numerical prediction models assist them in their 
task.228 
 
Even in meteorology, judgment is essential. And unlike judges or regulators, 
meteorologists have no recognizable duties to understand parties’ interests 
and arguments, and no worries about potential tensions between doing justice 
in a particular case and setting optimal precedent for future cases. The case 
for discretion among human decisionmakers—and, by extension, in the forms 
of legal practice deployed by those advocating before them—is far stronger 
in law than it is in meteorology. 
Flexibility is especially important for agencies regulating fast-moving 
fields.229 It will, of necessity, “break” both the brute force prediction models 
and the expert systems models of devotees of artificial intelligence in law. 
That is a feature, not a bug, of judicial and agency discretion. Many past 
                                                          
particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or 
the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within 
the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal 
with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. 
There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And 
the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one 
that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
228 DAIPHA, MASTERS OF UNCERTAINTY, supra note 218, at 52.  
229 Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2233 (2015). 
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efforts to rationalize and algorithmatize the law have failed, for good reason: 
there is no way to fairly extrapolate the thought processes of some body of 
past decisionmaking to all new scenarios. For example, the introduction of a 
“grid” of pre-programmed factors in social security disability determinations 
was originally seen as a prelude to automation of such decisions.230 But very 
quickly forms of discretion started entering into the grid, to do justice to the 
infinite variety of factual scenarios presented by sick and disabled 
claimants.231  
This is not to discount entirely the deployment of artificial 
intelligence in law. Brute force predictors may help advise clients as 
crystalline rules turn into muddy standards, and vice versa.232 They can also 
alert decisionmakers when biases begin to emerge.233 For example, a notable 
study in behavioral economics recently exposed judges imposing shorter 
sentences after lunch than before it.234 Ideally, such studies do not inspire 
predictive analytics firms like Lex Machina to find other extraneous 
influences on decisionmaking and to advise clients on how to take advantage 
of them (by, for example, sending tall attorneys to advocate before judges 
revealed to be partial to tall advocates). Rather, this disturbing finding is 
better framed as a prompt to judges to start developing ways of guarding 
                                                          
230 MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS 122 (1990). 
231 Bernard Wixon & Alexander Strand, Identifying SSA’s Sequential Disability 
Determination Steps Using Administrative Data, SOCIAL SECURITY (June 2013), 
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232 Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). 
233 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
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Decisions, 108 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. USA No. 17, 6889–92 (2010) (finding that the 
“likelihood of a favorable ruling is greater at the very beginning of the work day or after a 
food break than later in the sequence of cases”).  
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against this hunger bias once they’re alerted to it (or, failing that, to snack 
regularly).235 Other professionals (like physicians and pharmacists) routinely 
utilize automated alarms as “guard rails” to warn against potentially wrong 
decisions.236 Such decision support tools are not a replacement of the human 
with the algorithmic, but rather another step toward improving a socio-
technical system of human decisionmakers and machine-aided decision 
analysis.237 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The automation of a field as complex as law can lead to perverse 
consequences. Billed as a way of streamlining legal services, artificial 
intelligence can easily distort or subvert the purposes it is billed as 
supporting. Standardized legal forms may betray the objectives of the 
customer they ostensibly serve. Software can radically simplify compliance 
efforts, but when it does so by downplaying, trivializing, or ignoring 
important aspects of the language of law, it is a betrayal of the rule of law—
not its translation into code.  
Despite all these problems, many of which remain either unresolved 
or inadequately addressed, legal futurists continue to promote the 
acceleration of automation in law.238 As clients, bar associations, and 
legislators debate how far to permit software to substitute for legal counsel 
and advocacy, they should keep several themes of this article in mind. 
                                                          
235 David Golumbia, Judging Like a Machine, in POSTDIGITAL AESTHETICS (2014) (“As 
attractive as it may be to allow more and more of our world to be judged by machines, we 
must take very seriously the idea that human judgement, though it be systematically flawed, 
is nevertheless the only responsible form for human power to take.”).  
236 M. Susan Ridgley & Michael D. Greenberg, Too Many Alerts, Too Much Liability: 
Sorting Through the Malpractice Implications of Drug-Drug Interaction Clinical Decision 
Support, 5 S.L.U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 257, 259 (2012) (describing promise of decision 
support systems, and the need for judgment in the face of excessive alerts). 
237 Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 45 (2016). 
238  See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Accelerating Artificial Intelligence, 104 NW. U.L. REV. 366, 
368 (2010); SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 7, at 68; but 
see Frank Pasquale, Automating the Professions?,   
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Both humble and ambitious versions of substitutive legal automation 
have stalled, or failed to fully realize their announced ambitions.239 The legal 
profession should pursue an alternative paradigm—a complementary vision 
of human-machine cooperation. Known as intelligence augmentation, this 
pragmatic approach motivated far more advances in computing over the past 
half-century than dreams of general artificial intelligence.240 Complementary 
automation enables human attorneys, and other workers in the legal 
profession, to do justice to the complexity and subtlety of language.  
 Those working in the field of legal technology should be careful to 
avoid conflating attorneys’ professional role with the delivery of expertise. 
The rule of law entails a system of social relationships and legitimate 
governance, not simply the transfer and evaluation of information about 
behavior. There is necessarily some degree of self-governance among 
professionals, which gives them an occupational identity distinct from other 
workers. Their primary fiduciary duty is to clients, not managers or 
shareholders. The main reason they enjoy this autonomy is because they must 
handle intractable conflicts of values that repeatedly require thoughtful 
discretion and negotiation. A robust and ethical legal profession respects that 
discretion, founded on the flexibility and subtlety of legal language, as a 
prerequisite for a just and accountable social order. It ensures a rule of 
persons, not machines. 
                                                          
239 This problem is not limited to law. Concerns over “fake news” in the 2016 U.S. 
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